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Free Speech and Generally Applicable
Laws: A New Doctrinal Synthesis
Dan T. Coenen*
ABSTRACT: A longstanding mystery of constitutional law concerns how the
Free Speech Clause interacts with “generally applicable” legal restrictions.
This Article develops a new conceptual framework for working through this
puzzle. It does so by extracting from prior Supreme Court rulings an approach
that divides these restrictions into three separate categories, each of which (at
least presumptively) brings into play a different level of judicial scrutiny. An
example of the first and most closely scrutinized category of generally
applicable laws—that is, laws that place a “direct in effect” burden on
speech—is provided by breach-of-the-peace statutes. These laws are generally
applicable because they cover a great deal of behavior that has nothing to do
with speech, but they also often outlaw speech that triggers a violent response.
To the extent these laws do so, they proscribe speech in a direct-in-effect way,
in the key sense that their application depends on the communicative impact
of the regulated activity. In contrast, the second category of generally
applicable laws, which trigger only intermediate scrutiny, has nothing to do
with restricting speech based on any listener reaction. In United States v.
O’Brien, for example, the government relied on an across-the-board ban on
draft-card destruction to prosecute a war protester who burned his card as a
form of symbolic dissent. This case, the Court concluded, involved merely an
“incidental” (as opposed to a direct-in-effect) burden on speech because the
challenged statute covered each and every instance of draft card burning
wholly apart from the impact that any such action might have on the mind
of any observer. The third category of generally applicable laws received the
Court’s attention in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., which involved a
challenge to an ordinance that required the closure of any place of business—
in this case a bookstore—where prostitution or other “lewd” activities had
occurred. Obviously, the closing of a bookstore imposed a burden on speech.
But this burden did not trigger any First Amendment scrutiny because the
defendants in Arcara were not (as was the defendant in O’Brien) punished
*
University Professor & Harmon W. Caldwell Chair in Constitutional Law, University of
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for activity that itself involved expression; rather, those defendants were
punished for tolerating on-premises acts of lewdness, which did not involve
speech at all. Put another way, the case involved only a “doubly incidental”
burden on speech—that is, the sort of burden imposed by a wide range of laws
(including tax laws, labor laws, and health laws) that do not operate on
speech itself but instead diminish the resources or capacity of would-be
speakers to engage in expressive activity.
This Article develops in detail this tripartite structure for analyzing Free
Speech Clause challenges to generally applicable laws. In particular, it
highlights the complexity of this body of law, identifying the rich mix of
exceptions to the three core rules around which the Court’s governing doctrine
is organized. In addition, this Article shows that—and explains why—the
Court has taken a fundamentally different approach to generally applicable
laws in the free-speech and free-exercise-of-religion contexts. Along the way, the
Article notes that the current Court has signaled a potential willingness to
tinker with existing doctrine, including by expanding Free Speech Clause
limits on generally applicable antidiscrimination laws. At the same time, this
Article posits that the key features of the three-part approach toward which the
Court has haltingly, but discernibly, moved over the years comports with
overarching First Amendment theory.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Categories are central to free-expression jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court, for example, has sharply distinguished between protected and
unprotected speech, content-discriminatory and content-neutral statutes, and
public and non-public forums.1 Another key dividing line separates laws that
directly burden speech from laws that burden speech only “incidentally.”2
1. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §§ 11.1–11.4.3
(5th ed. 2011).
2. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1176–78 (1996). An expansive literature touches on the sweeping variety of issues raised by such
laws. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2 to 12-7, at 789–832,
§ 12-23, at 977–86 (2d ed. 1988); Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations
of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1990); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029 (2015); David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First
Amendment, 26 SW. L. REV. 201 (1997); Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (2016); Joshua P. Davis & Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Inherent Structure of Free Speech Law,
19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131 (2010); David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42
U. MIAMI L. REV. 491 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 35 GA. L. REV. 1087 (2001); Raleigh E. Hansman, Doctrinal Development or Devolution?: An
Examination of the Incidental Regulation Test from Texas v. Johnson Through Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 57 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 122 (2012); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The
Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Wendy K.
Olin, Constitutional Survival Camp: What are the Chances that the General Applicability Test Will Make
It?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1029 (1995); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249 (1995); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001);
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265
(1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories]; Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the
Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779 (1985) [hereinafter
Schauer, Cuban Cigars]; Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
419 (2012); Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A MotiveBased Rationalization of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401 (1995);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987) [hereinafter Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions]; Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons
from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273 (2009) [hereinafter Stone, Free Speech]; Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992) [hereinafter
Volokh, Workplace Harassment]; Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277
(2005) [hereinafter Volokh, Speech as Conduct]; Keith Werhan, The O’Briening of Free Speech
Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635 (1987); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991); Note, Neutral Rules of General Applicability: Incidental

A2_COENEN (DO NOT DELETE)

438

1/7/2018 10:49 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:435

Restrictions on defamation, for example, fall into the direct-burden category
because they provide redress for reputation-harming expression itself.3 In
contrast, a law that prohibits vandalism burdens speech only incidentally, even
when applied to the dissident who spray paints “MAKE LOVE, NOT WAR” on
the Washington Monument. Vandalism laws, after all, do not target
expression. Nor do they concern expression in many of their applications.4 As
a result, courts often describe such laws as “generally applicable,” with the
consequence that they receive only limited, if any, judicial scrutiny in their
application to expressive activity.5
These concepts lie at the heart of First Amendment law.6 They also are of
far-reaching practical importance because most laws are generally applicable,
and such laws interact with expressive activities in “virtually limitless” ways.7
Even so, these concepts are deeply undertheorized and widely
misunderstood—so much so that commentators have decried the Supreme
Court’s rulings in this area as “perplexing,”8 “inconsistent,”9 and
“conflicting.”10
Confusion springs from a mix of sources. To begin with, decisions that
call for deferential review of “generally applicable laws” based on their
“incidental” effects have not supplied useful definitions of these key terms.11
Burdens on Religion, Speech, and Property, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1713 (2002) [hereinafter Neutral Rules
of General Applicability].
3. See Garfield, supra note 2, at 1096; Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1294; see
also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 11:11 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that the defamation
tort is “different in kind” for this reason).
4. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 492.
5. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Day, supra note 2, at 492 (describing the “incidental regulation standard” as
“one of the three pillars of the modern free speech doctrine”); Dorf, supra note 2, at 1176–77
(explaining that direct and incidental restraints give rise to the two principal ways that
“[f]undamental constitutional rights are burdened”); Kagan, supra note 2, at 491 (characterizing
“the distinction between direct and incidental restrictions on speech” as “a distinction as
important as any in First Amendment law”).
7. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at 105 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 931
(arguing that “all laws have information effects” and thus are potentially susceptible to First
Amendment review); Schauer, Cuban Cigars, supra note 2, at 784 (highlighting the “enormous
range of government decisions” and the “host of government actions that” incidentally affect
speech); id. at 779 (providing examples); see also Stone, Free Speech, supra note 2, at 290 (noting
that generally applicable laws “come in many shapes and sizes”). This body of law has also taken
on greater importance “in light of the pervasiveness of government regulation in the modern
state.” Dorf, supra note 2, at 1201.
8. Shaman, supra note 2, at 423.
9. Day, supra note 2, at 495 n.15.
10. Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 403.
11. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 1200 (“No unified constitutional doctrine of incidental
burdens currently exists.”); id. at 1251 (noting that the Court’s work in this area has occurred
“haltingly and sometimes unwittingly”); Garfield, supra note 2, at 1105–06 (noting different
meanings of the term “incidental”); Olin, supra note 2, at 1030 (“The Court . . . has not clearly
articulated a definition of a generally applicable law . . . .”); id. at 1039 (expanding on this point
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In addition, the Court has held that some generally applicable laws call for
meaningful judicial scrutiny, while other generally applicable laws merit no
scrutiny at all.12 But the Justices have failed to explain with clarity how lower
courts are to distinguish between these separate sets of cases.13 Another
complication arises from the Court’s landmark Free Exercise Clause ruling in
Employment Division v. Smith.14 In that case, the Court held that a religious
practitioner who ingested peyote as a sacramental act could not challenge an
across-the-board prohibition on peyote use as applied to him precisely
because of its “generally applicable” character.15 Common sense might
suggest that a serious speaker should be no more able to challenge a generally
applicable law than a serious worshipper; however, Supreme Court doctrine
does not track this intuition, and the Justices have never told us why.
This Article grapples with these matters. It posits that the Court’s Free
Speech Clause jurisprudence, on close examination, supports an approach
that divides up generally-applicable-law cases into three mutually exclusive

by highlighting difficulties of analysis and prediction that result); Shaman, supra note 2, at 423
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s treatment of rules of general applicability has been anything but
consistent. . . . [It] has wavered from one extreme to the other . . . .”); Srinivasan, supra note 2, at
402–03 (noting “doctrinal confusion” associated with “‘generally applicable’ laws . . . that in some
applications ‘incidentally’ restrict speech” and that “the Supreme Court has paid . . . little
attention” to the significance of these terms); Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1294
(noting different uses of the term “generally applicable law”). The confusion sown by the Court’s
own struggles is well-evidenced by the inconsistent use of relevant terminology in the scholarly
commentary. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 2, at 492 (treating together as “general law[s],” which
involve an “incidental restraint,” tax laws and labor laws that burden publishers, vandalism laws
as applied to “draw[ing] swastikas on a synagogue wall” and the statute at issue in O’Brien);
Schauer, Cuban Cigars, supra note 2, at 779–82 (labeling as “generally applicable government
regulations” with “incidental effect[s]” both antitrust and labor laws subjected to strict scrutiny
and the sleeping-in-the-park regulation that triggered only intermediate scrutiny); Shaman, supra
note 2, at 438–39 (defending the strict-scrutiny approach to “generally applicable law” at issue in
Humanitarian Law Project because it “was being applied to regulate expressive conduct,” but not
indicating why O’Brien—to which the same description applied—resulted in only intermediate
scrutiny); Williams, supra note 2, at 722–23 (arguing that the “incidental” label should not apply
to cases in which the Court has applied it). Compare, e.g., Werhan, supra note 2, at 650–52
(asserting that a leafletting case involved “a direct restriction on expression”), with Members of
the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (characterizing a
sign-posting ban as involving only an “incidental restriction on expression”). On occasion,
frustration with the Court’s work in this area surfaces within the Court itself. See Day, supra note
2, at 511 (noting Justice Stewart’s objection to the majority’s application of the “incidental
regulation test” to a military rule that involved “purposeful” suppression of expressive petitioncirculating activities).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
15. Id. at 878–79.
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categories, as illustrated by three seminal cases: Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project,16 United States v. O’Brien,17 and Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.18
In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court confronted a federal statute that
barred the giving of “material support” to terrorist groups and defined
“material support” to include “training.”19 Humanitarian Law Project, a
nonprofit organization, argued that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to its activities because it sought to communicate with a governmentlisted terrorist group only to offer instruction on peaceable matters, such as
pursuing change through legislative reform.20 In response, the government
argued that the statute should escape strict scrutiny because it was “generally
applicable”; after all, the government insisted, the material-support
prohibition covered speakers and non-speakers alike, and it did so in an effort
not to stifle expression but to stem terrorist violence.21 The Court, however,
rejected this position. It reasoned that the law as applied to the challenger did
target speech because the expression at issue in this particular case—the
giving of instruction—was what constituted the statutorily prohibited material
support.22 In other words, to use the category-defining terms developed in this
Article, the statute placed a direct-in-effect burden on expression in its
application to Humanitarian Law Project because that law operated against
that organization precisely and only because it was speaking.23
A contrasting set of facts gave rise to O’Brien. That case involved a Free
Speech Clause defense asserted by a draft-card-burning political protestor
prosecuted under a law that banned all forms of draft-card mutilation.24 Faced
with these facts, the Court assumed that the draft-card burning that triggered
the prohibition’s operation constituted “speech” for First Amendment
purposes.25 Unlike in Humanitarian Law Project, however, the communicative
impact of the speech in O’Brien had nothing to do with the criminality of the
defendant’s behavior. The mutilation of the draft card was in and of itself the
actus reus of the crime, regardless of any communicative impact that the
mutilation might have had on any listener or observer. For this reason, in
contrast to the situation in Humanitarian Law Project, the across-the-board ban
on draft-card destruction placed only an incidental burden on the war

16. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
17. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
18. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
19. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8–9 (referring to the prohibitions described in 18
U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) and relevant definitions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)).
20. Id. at 4–5, 10–11.
21. Id. at 26–29.
22. Id. at 27.
23. Id. at 26–27.
24. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369–70 (1968).
25. See id. at 376.
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protestor’s speech, as opposed to burdening his speech in a direct-in-effect
way.
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. illustrates a third type of generally applicable
26
law. That case involved the application to bookstore operators of a New York
statute that called for the closure of any place of business involved in acts of
unlawful public lewdness.27 Invoking the statute, a state court shut down the
defendants’ store for a year because prostitution and other unlawful sexrelated activity had been occurring on its premises.28 On appeal, the
defendants asserted that a government-mandated closure of an entire
bookstore involved such a draconian interference with communicative liberty
that the state law, as applied to them, violated the Free Speech Clause.29 The
Court, however, rejected this claim, employing an even less exacting form of
review than it had put to work in O’Brien. The Court reasoned that the
bookstore case differed from the draft-card case because the operation of the
legal prohibition at issue in Arcara was not triggered by speech at all; rather,
it was triggered by lewd acts that involved “absolutely no element of protected
expression.”30
On its face, the closing of a bookstore interfered with communicative
activity.31 But such a result, the Court explained, often arises when
applications of non-speech-related laws impede opportunities to engage in
expression—as when, for example, a large damages award levied against a
negligent driver reduces that person’s financial capacity to send out political
messages.32 These sorts of cases, according to the synthesis developed here,
involve a doubly incidental burden on speech. This label applies because the
challenged law in its application neither purposefully targets the expressive
effects of conduct (as in Humanitarian Law Project) nor non-purposefully
outlaws speech in the sense that the prohibited conduct turns out to be itself
expressive (as in O’Brien). Rather, the claimed interference with speech arises
only because the operation of the challenged prohibition on non-speech—
which in Arcara took the form of prostitution and other lewd, noncommunicative acts—has ripple effects that include an inhibition on
engaging in communicative activity. In effect, the Court in Arcara held that
generally applicable laws that impose doubly incidental burdens on speech
are categorically distinguishable from laws that impose direct-in-effect or
incidental burdens on expression.
So why, exactly, does it matter whether the law that faces First
Amendment challenge imposes a direct-in-effect, incidental, or doubly
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
Id. at 698–702.
Id.
Id. at 700–02.
Id. at 705.
See id. at 705–06.
Id. at 706.
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incidental burden on speech? The answer, not surprisingly, is that—at least as
a general matter—different levels of scrutiny apply to cases that fall into these
different legal categories. More specifically, (1) when a generally applicable
law has the effect of burdening speech in a direct-in-effect way (as in
Humanitarian Law Project), the Court has applied strict scrutiny;33 (2) when
such a law burdens speech in an incidental way (as in O’Brien), the Court has
applied intermediate scrutiny;34 and (3) when such a law burdens speech in a
doubly incidental way (as in Arcara), the Court has applied no First Amendment
scrutiny at all.35 On the face of things, this organizational structure seems
straightforward. In fact, however, complexities lurk around every turn. This
Article lays bare and grapples with those complexities.
Part II highlights the many difficulties that mark the Court’s past
application of the Free Speech Clause to generally applicable laws. At the
heart of this discussion lies Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.36 and the Court’s murky
treatment in that case of its earlier ruling in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.37
Part II does not visit every complication raised by the Court’s treatment of
First Amendment challenges to generally applicable laws, but it tells enough
of the tale to show that analytical quandaries pervade this constitutional field.
Part III begins the process of untangling the doctrinal knot by focusing
attention on direct-in-effect-burden cases. Central to this discussion is
Professor Eugene Volokh’s claim that some generally applicable laws should
be subject to aggressive First Amendment scrutiny because they are “contentbased as applied.”38 Part III explains how the Court’s ruling in Humanitarian
Law Project, while potentially subject to other interpretations, is best
understood as vindicating the speech-protective thesis set forth in Professor
Volokh’s earlier work. It also suggests that some generally applicable laws may
impose particularly significant burdens on speech even though they do not
involve content discrimination—a fact that suggests why the term “direct-ineffect burden” may better capture the principle embraced in Humanitarian
Law Project than the “content-based as applied” formulation put forward by
Professor Volokh.
Part IV shifts attention to incidental-burden cases. In particular, it
considers whether the Court’s free-exercise ruling in Smith has knocked the
legs out from under O’Brien’s intermediate-scrutiny approach to Free Speech
Clause cases. Part IV advances the position that O’Brien remains good law
notwithstanding Smith because different policy concerns are at work in freespeech and free-exercise cases. In addition, Part IV identifies and rejects the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706–07.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1286–87.
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normative claim that O’Brien-based review has become so feckless in practical
operation that retaining it is not worth the candle.
Part V turns to the set of problems raised by Arcara. It posits that the noreview approach laid down in that case for doubly-incidental-burden cases has
proven to have a bark that is worse than its bite. This is the case because both
courts and commentators have concluded that the Arcara rule should be laced
with exceptions. This development gives rise to both irony and opportunity.
Irony exists because Arcara offered the promise of simplifying the law by
injecting into it an easy-to-apply, bright-line rule. The well-marked safe harbor
that the Justices sought to construct in that case, however, has turned out to
be neither well-marked nor safe because of the many doctrinal qualifications
that have grown up around it. Opportunity arises for this same reason—that
is, the opportunity for thoughtful lawyers to skirt Arcara’s no-review rule by
creatively invoking exceptions to it.
Part VI steps away from these matters of doctrinal synthesis to reflect
more broadly on the interaction of the First Amendment and generally
applicable laws. It emphasizes the need for lawyers to approach these cases
with the three-part doctrinal structure developed here firmly in mind, both to
avoid missteps of analysis and to ensure that they do not miss chances to
advance the interests of their clients. Part VI also notes that recent changes in
the Court’s membership have created favorable conditions for lawyers
interested in expanding speech-based protections against the operation of
generally applicable laws.
At bottom, the aim of this Article is to extract from an existing doctrinal
morass an organizing, if still-evolving, synthesis of the law. This synthesis
places all of the Court’s key precedents within a coherent organizational
framework, and—at least as a general matter—shows that this framework
sensibly takes account of the different levels of threat to expressive liberty
posed by different types of generally applicable laws. It is concerning that the
Court’s own rhetoric often has done more to obfuscate than to illuminate this
doctrinal architecture.39 As this Article will demonstrate, however, the full
body of the Court’s rhetoric is clear enough, and the Court’s actions speak
louder than its words. The end result is that the Court’s treatment of generally
applicable laws under the Free Speech Clause reflects the three-part analytical
structure—based on direct-in-effect, incidental, and doubly incidental
burdens on speech—that is both laid bare and significantly refined in the
pages that follow.
II.

THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

Any discussion of “generally applicable laws” must begin at the
beginning—that is, by reflecting on what types of laws qualify as “generally
applicable.” Courts often act as if the term is self-defining, but it is not.
39.

See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Consider an ordinance that bans “leafletting” and goes on to define the term
as “distributing in a public place any papers to passersby.” At first blush, this
law seems not to be generally applicable because it targets only leafletting, a
quintessential First Amendment activity.40 On close inspection, however, the
law targets more than expressive leafletting because even a person who hands
out blank sheets of paper (perhaps because she is in a gift-giving mood) falls
within the legal prohibition. What is more, the ordinance does not
discriminate based on the content of the distributed material, and its
underlying purpose is to cut down on littering, not to cut down on speech.
Indeed, for all these reasons, the ordinance bears a close resemblance to the
draft-card-mutilation statute that the Court deemed “generally applicable” in
O’Brien.41 Using the verbiage of that case, one might well say that the antileafletting law—because it covers both communicative and noncommunicative activity in addressing the non-speech-related goal of
discouraging littering—“is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”42
Complications arise, however, because existing law suggests that the
Supreme Court would not apply the “generally applicable” label to this
ordinance—and with good reason.43 The key point is that the ordinance lays
its sting on speech-related activity as a practical matter, because precious few
individuals in the real world display their munificence by handing out blank
sheets of paper. As this Article later explains, the Court has overlaid its
treatment of generally applicable laws in free-speech cases with a significant
qualification based on real-world effects.44 This approach seems sensible, in
part because it tracks the Court’s handling of similar problems in analogous
settings,45 and because it responds to the sensible notion that “[t]he proper
focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction,
not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”46 The point is that sometimes a
law that appears to be “generally applicable” on its face will not qualify as
“generally applicable” for legal purposes because of its predominant speechinhibiting practical effects. And because the term “predominant speechinhibiting practical effects” is not (to say the least) self-defining, neither is the
term “generally applicable laws.”
A related set of questions regarding the general applicability of laws
concerns legislative purpose. In Texas v. Johnson, for example, the Court

40.
See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“Liberty of circulating is as
essential . . . as liberty of publishing . . . .” (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878))).
41. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
42. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
43. See infra notes 217–28 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 217–28 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (noting that assessing whether
a statute has merely “incidental effects on interstate commerce” requires evaluation both of the
statute “on its face” and its “practical effect”).
46. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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invalidated a state statute that criminalized desecration of the American flag.47
A major problem with the law sprang from its express terms, which limited
the law’s reach to flag burnings “that the actor knows will seriously offend one
or more persons.”48 Because this turn of the statutory phrase tied criminality
to the particular flag-burning audience’s mental reaction, the Court in effect
deemed the law not to be generally applicable because it was contentdiscriminatory on its face.49 In the wake of Johnson, however, an all-star team
of free-speech lawyers set about drafting a flag-burning statute that would
withstand constitutional challenge. The product of their efforts was the
federal Flag Protection Act of 1989, which—in pointed contrast to the statute
at issue in Johnson—made no mention of the taking of “offense” or any other
form of viewer reaction.50 The result, so the argument went, was that this new
statute—because it omitted any reference to audience reaction—was
“generally applicable” and therefore outside the reach of the Court’s earlier
flag-burning ruling.51
In United States v. Eichman, however, the Court refused to distinguish
Johnson and struck down the new federal flag-burning law. Decisive to the
Court was not the new statute’s text, but its underlying purpose. According to
Justice Brennan, because the purpose of the new law remained centered on
stifling messages inconsistent with the unity-promoting meaning of the flag,
the law was not “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” for purposes
of O’Brien and thus did not bring into play the ramped-down style of scrutiny
made applicable by that case to generally applicable laws.52 Put another way,
a law that is “related to the suppression of free expression” is in its nature not
generally applicable, and a law can be related to the suppression of expression
on its face (as in Texas v. Johnson), in its overwhelming effect (as in the
leafletting case), or in its underlying purpose (as in Eichman). On the other
hand, so long as a law does not fall into one of these categories, the law will
qualify as generally applicable.53

47. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
48. Id. at 400 n.1.
49. Id. at 407.
50. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101–131, 103 Stat. 777 (as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 700).
51. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 492 (describing the law in Eichman as “generally applicable”);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 111, 119 (1989) (defending
the law on this ground).
52. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990) (citing United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). See also Day, supra note 2, at 499 (“[T]he adverse impact for [O’Brientype] regulations is considered incidental because it is nonpurposeful.”).
53. A specialized set of limits, including with regard to generally applicable laws, applies to
government restrictions that limit speech in so-called public forums. See Post, supra note 2, at
1260–61 (critiquing the Court’s conflation of review for time, place, and manner restrictions,
including in regard to use of public forums, and statutes that, like the one in O’Brien, do not focus
on speech). Cases that involve such limits raise specialized concerns and therefore do not receive
focused attention here.
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Once a court concludes that a law qualifies as generally applicable, its
work is hardly done. Among other things, the court must evaluate whether
the challenged law burdens speech in a direct-in-effect, incidental, or doubly
incidental way and then determine the impact of placing the law into the
applicable type-of-burden pigeonhole. Grappling with challenged laws in this
way is not for the faint of heart, and that point is well-illustrated by the Court’s
1991 ruling in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.54 That case (which is not to be
confused with Cohen v. California, another soon-to-be-discussed precedent that
also has importance in this context) warrants close attention for two reasons.
First, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. itself constitutes a major Supreme Court
precedent on generally applicable laws and thus must find a place within any
synthesis of the law in this field. Second, the case illuminates the rich mix of
analytical problems presented by Free Speech Clause challenges to generally
applicable laws.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. arose out of a $200,000 compensatory-damages
award assessed against a reporter and his employer under state promissoryestoppel law.55 The action was filed after the reporter breached a promise not
to disclose the name of a would-be confidential source, Dan Cohen, thus
causing him to suffer significant harms that included the loss of his job.56 The
reporter’s promise had come in return for Cohen’s provision of information
about past criminal charges brought against Marlene Johnson, who was then
running as the Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidate for Lieutenant Governor
of Minnesota.57 Notwithstanding the promise, the reporter and his editors
ultimately decided to publish Cohen’s name, apparently because (1) he
turned out to be a Republican Party associate of a leading gubernatorial
candidate; (2) most of the charges against Johnson had been dropped; and
(3) the one conviction that resulted from those charges had previously been
vacated and involved only a minor matter.58 Put another way, the defendants
deemed it newsworthy that prominent opponents of a candidate for a major
statewide office might have been trying to sabotage her campaign by
circulating overblown charges of wrongdoing against her. They also
concluded that sharing the name of their source was necessary to provide a
proper reporting of this story.59
Faced with these facts, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that “in
this case enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a promissory
estoppel theory would violate the defendants’ First Amendment rights.”60 A
five-Justice majority of the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In an opinion
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 665–66.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 665–66.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 667 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990)).
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written by Justice White, the Court acknowledged that its past decisions
broadly precluded the imposition of penalties for reporting information that
had lawfully come into a reporter’s hands—for example, the name of a rape
victim made available in non-confidential police reports.61 The majority
observed, however, that
this case . . . is not controlled by this line of cases but, rather, by the
equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because
their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news.62
According to Justice White:
The press, like others interested in publishing, may not publish
copyrighted material without obeying the copyright laws. Similarly,
the media must obey the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act, may not restrain trade in violation of the
antitrust laws, and must pay nondiscriminatory taxes . . . .
Accordingly, enforcement of such general laws against the press is
not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement
against other persons or organizations.63
In addition, Justice White observed that promissory estoppel constituted
a “doctrine . . . generally applicable to the daily transactions of all the citizens
of Minnesota”64 and that “Minnesota law simply requires those making
promises to keep them.”65 In sum, “generally applicable laws do not offend
the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”66
In dissent, Justice Souter took a very different approach. For starters, he
declared that “‘there is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general
applicability,’ for such laws may restrict First Amendment rights just as
effectively as those directed specifically at speech itself.”67 In addition, this
case fell outside “the line of authority holding the press to laws of general
applicability where commercial activities and relationships, not the content of
publication, are at issue.”68 For this reason, Justice Souter could not accept
“the majority’s position that we may dispense with balancing”; rather, because
he refused to view “the fact of general applicability to be dispositive,” he
61. Id. at 671 (distinguishing Cohen from Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)).
62. Id. at 669.
63. Id. at 669–70 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 670.
65. Id. at 671.
66. Id. at 669.
67. Id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
68. Id. at 676–77.
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deemed it “necessary to articulate, measure, and compare the competing
interests involved” in the case.69 Justice Souter acknowledged that it would be
wrong “to say that the breach of such a promise of confidentiality could never
give rise to liability.”70 In this case, however, “the State’s interest in enforcing
a newspaper’s promise of confidentiality [was] insufficient to outweigh the
interest in unfettered publication of the information . . . .”71
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Souter that
the cases relied on by the majority—such as those that concerned tax,
antitrust, and labor laws—were uninformative because they “did not involve
the imposition of liability based upon the content of speech.”72 Instead, he
found the Court’s earlier ruling in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell73 “to be precisely
on point.”74 Hustler involved a jury’s award of damages to the well-known
religious leader, Jerry Falwell, based on a liquor-advertisement parody that
referenced Reverend Falwell’s “first time” with his mother in an outhouse.75
As Justice Blackmun explained:
There, we found that the use of a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to impose liability for the publication of a satirical
critique violated the First Amendment. There was no doubt that
Virginia’s tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was “a
law of general applicability” unrelated to the suppression of speech.
Nonetheless, a unanimous Court found that, when used to penalize
the expression of opinion, the law was subject to the strictures of the
First Amendment.76
According to Justice Blackmun: “As in Hustler, the operation of
Minnesota’s doctrine of promissory estoppel in this case cannot be said to
have a merely ‘incidental’ burden on speech; the publication of important
political speech is the claimed violation.”77 It followed for Justice Blackmun
that Minnesota promissory-estoppel law could “not be enforced to punish the
expression of truthful information,” at least when—as in this case—“the
State’s interest in enforcing its promissory estoppel doctrine . . . was far from
compelling.”78
Not surprisingly, Justice White paused to respond to Justice Blackmun’s
invocation of Hustler. That case was not controlling, Justice White wrote,
69. Id. at 677.
70. Id. at 678.
71. Id. at 679.
72. Id. at 674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
74. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 48.
76. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674–75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S.
at 50 n.3).
77. Id. at 675.
78. Id. at 675–76.
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because “Cohen is not seeking damages for injury to his reputation or his state
of mind”; instead he had recovered compensatory damages “for breach of a
promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity.”79
Justice Blackmun was unsatisfied. He reminded the majority that its basic
reason for rejecting the defendants’ First Amendment challenge was that the
case involved a “law of general applicability.”80 Nothing in Justice White’s
analysis of Hustler, Justice Blackmun insisted, changed the fact that the
common-law, intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress cause of action—just
like the common-law, promissory-estoppel cause of action—constituted a
generally applicable law.81 In addition, according to Justice Blackmun, there
was “no meaningful distinction between a statute that penalizes published
speech in order to protect the individual’s psychological well-being or
reputational interest and one that exacts the same penalty in order to
compensate the loss of employment or earning potential.”82 At the least, he
emphasized, “our decision in Hustler recognized no such distinction.”83
These dueling contentions about the Hustler precedent give rise to a host
of questions that illuminate the sorts of problems posed by First Amendment
challenges to generally applicable laws. To begin with, much of Justice White’s
analysis seemed to focus on whether the press possesses any measure of
expressive freedom above and beyond the expressive freedom enjoyed by
other speakers.84 To be sure, it could be that the First Amendment’s Free Press
Clause imposes more exacting limits on generally applicable laws than does
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause; however, one holding of Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. seems to be (unfortunately for the defendants in the case)
that it does not.85 The problem is that Justice White’s opinion did not take
care to clarify what portions of his opinion concerned the Press Clause and
what portions concerned the Speech Clause—as any proper treatment of a
First Amendment challenge to a generally applicable law should be sure to
do.
Nor did the analytical problems in Justice White’s opinion stop there. For
example, he grouped Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. together with pre-Hustler
precedents that left undisturbed state-imposed duties to make payments of
taxes or wages even though those payments effectively inhibit a publisher’s
ability to engage in communication. This analogy, however, is deeply
problematic. The difficulty is that the constitutional challenge in Cohen v.

79. Id. at 671 (majority opinion).
80. Id. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Garfield, supra note 2, at 1093 (summarizing the
majority’s decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.).
81. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674–75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S.
at 50 n.3).
82. Id. at 675 n.3
83. Id.
84. See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1295–96 (detailing this point).
85. See id.
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Cowles Media Co. arose because the defendants’ duty to pay damages resulted
specifically from the defendants’ expressive activity—that is, the printing of a
newspaper account of Mr. Cohen’s actions that included his name. In
contrast, earlier challenges by publishers to payments that resulted from the
enforcement of minimum-wage, tax, and other similar laws did not concern
government action that came to bear on speech itself; instead, the operative
theory underlying those challenges was that these forms of non-speech
regulation would have ripple effects that inhibited speech by shrinking the
pool of resources that a publisher could direct toward speech activity. These
cases, in other words, involved laws that imposed (to use the nomenclature of
this Article) only doubly incidental burdens on speech. But Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co.—because it grew out the imposition of liability based on the content
of speech itself—involved a speech burden of a more direct kind.
Nor did Justice White do much in the way of countering Justice
Blackmun’s invocation of Hustler. Justice White emphasized, for example, that
state promissory-estoppel law applied broadly “to the daily transactions of all
the citizens of Minnesota,” many of which transactions obviously did not
involve promises about speaking at all.86 But no one questioned the
proposition that the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress—just like the cause of action for promissory estoppel—reached across
“the daily transactions” of all state residents and could be triggered by both
speech-based and non-speech-based activities.87 In addition, while Justice
White sought to distinguish Hustler by highlighting the difference between
monetary and non-monetary injuries, he never explained why this posited
distinction made sense for First Amendment purposes.88 One might say that
Justice White meant to suggest that monetary injuries are in general more
severe, and thus less tolerable, than injuries to one’s psyche and emotions.89
That proposition, however, is hardly self-evident. Moreover, attributing to
Justice White this unstated one-injury-is-worse-than-the-other logic seems to
clash with his overarching approach to the case. An assessment of the varied
weightiness of relevant state interests, after all, would have engaged the Court
in the very sort of interest-balancing analysis that its no-review treatment of
the case was, from all appearances, designed to avoid.90
86. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
87. Id.
88. See Garfield, supra note 2, at 1123 (decrying Justice White’s suggested distinction
between economic and reputational damages as “specious”).
89. Cf. id. at 1088 (condemning the majority’s “brusque treatment” of the defendants’ First
Amendment argument).
90. Another problem is that this reading of the case clashes with well-settled Supreme Court
precedent. That precedent, after all, has never even hinted that a monetary-injury exception
limits the long-categorically-stated principle “that liability for the defamation of a public official
or figure requires proof that defamatory statements were made with knowledge or reckless
disregard of their falsity.” United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2563 (2012). The Court has
stated no less categorically that “[t]his same requirement applies when public officials and figures
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No less perplexing was the majority’s course of action once it declared
that Minnesota’s promissory-estoppel doctrine constituted a generally
applicable law. As previously detailed, the Court in United States v. O’Brien
responded to a war protester’s challenge to a generally applicable draft-cardmutilation law by applying intermediate scrutiny.91 The Court thus put to
work a mode of analysis that fell short of strict scrutiny but nonetheless
involved a structured balancing of the claimed free-speech right and
countervailing state interests at play in that case. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
however, the majority did not apply either strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Rather, Justice White deemed it appropriate to—as Justice Souter put it—
“dispense with balancing” altogether.92 In other words, the majority applied
no free-speech-based scrutiny to the challenged application of the promissoryestoppel law, and it did so without even mentioning, far less distinguishing,
the Court’s earlier ruling in O’Brien.
This omission is not easy to understand.93 In particular, the state
promissory-estoppel law, just like the federal draft-card-mutilation law,
applied to speakers and non-speakers alike, and both laws advanced
underlying interests—having persons keep their promises in one case and
keep their draft cards in the other—that were “unrelated to the suppression
of speech.”94 Indeed, for two separate reasons, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
seemed to present an even more appealing set of facts than did O’Brien for
triggering some form of meaningful First Amendment review. First, Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. did not involve only “speech . . . brigaded with action” (that
is, the mutilation of a physical object);95 rather, it involved “pure speech” (that
is, the publishing of actual words in an actual newspaper).96 Second, in Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co., unlike in O’Brien, the operation of the challenged law

seek to recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. (emphasis added).
See also Church of Scientology Int’l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 177 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing
that defamation plaintiff’s “status as a public figure means that it was required to demonstrate
actual malice, whatever remedy it sought”).
91. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (using “substantial governmental
interest” test that the Court later characterized of entailing intermediate scrutiny).
92. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. See Bogen, supra note 2, at 204 (viewing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. as holding “that the
incidental effects of a generally applicable law do not violate the First Amendment” in derogation
of O’Brien); Garfield, supra note 2, at 1106–07 (seeing a “conundrum” in the Court’s failure to
“mention O’Brien or use the test announced in that case”); Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 419
(indicating that Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. “seems to violate” the overarching principle of O’Brien).
94. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (emphasis added); see also Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government generally has a freer hand in restricting
expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.”). See generally Bogen,
supra note 2, at 229 (“One would think the Court would be embarrassed to give nude dancing
more scrutiny than it gave the press, yet it did so [with its generally-applicable-law rulings in Barnes
and Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.].”).
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hinged on the content of the relevant communication in a meaningful sense.
The defendant’s liability, after all, was triggered only by publishing a story that
included particular information—that is, the source’s name. Justice
Blackmun emphasized this point in his dissent when he observed that “the
publication of important political speech is the claimed violation” of the
challenged state law.97 Thoughtful analysts have highlighted this same point,
too.98
If Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. presented a stronger case for applying First
Amendment interest-balancing analysis than O’Brien itself, why did Justice
White opt for a less stringent mode of scrutiny than the Court had applied in
the draft-card case? In a related vein, why did Hustler, which Justice Blackmun
described as involving “a law of general applicability,”99 produce an even
stricter mode of constitutional review than the Court applied to the
paradigmatic generally applicable law at issue in O’Brien? A full understanding
of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., O’Brien, and Hustler also requires investigating
how they fit together with both Humanitarian Law Project and Arcara. This
Article will explain in due course how the Court’s ruling in Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co. is reconcilable with these precedents and with O’Brien and Hustler
as well. The trail to that destination, however, is not easy to follow, and that is
the key point for now. Put simply, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. highlights how
difficult it is to process the many and varied questions presented by freespeech cases that concern generally applicable laws. The remainder of this
Article seeks to identify the key questions these cases present, as well as the
most useful analytical tools for working through those questions in a sound
way.
III.

DIRECT-IN-EFFECT BURDENS ON SPEECH

How could it be that the Court applied a highly aggressive mode of First
Amendment scrutiny in the Hustler case, but not in either O’Brien or Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co.? One possible answer draws on First Amendment law’s
specialized, speech-protective treatment of libel and slander. On this view,
because the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress bears a close
resemblance to the tort of defamation, courts faced with constitutional
challenges should take much of the same approach in both contexts. In fact,
the form of elevated scrutiny that the Court applied in Hustler made use of the
same “actual malice” test previously developed in New York Times v. Sullivan to

97. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. See Bogen, supra note 2, at 227 (asserting that liability in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. hinged
on the “content of the speech”); Garfield, supra note 2, at 1096 (noting Justice White’s “failure”
to consider this point); William E. Lee, The Unusual Suspects: Journalists as Thieves, 8 WM. & MARY
B. RTS. J. 53, 132 (1999) (“[T]he communicative impact of the publication was the heart of the
plaintiff’s damage claim.”).
99. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674–75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 n.3 (1988)).
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deal with defamation directed at public officials and public figures.100 One
way of thinking about Hustler, then, is as a logical build-out of the principle of
the New York Times case. It might be that the Hustler rule—which applies
aggressive First Amendment scrutiny in intentional-infliction-of-emotionaldistress cases that involve public-officials or public-figure plaintiffs—was
fashioned to counteract would-be work-arounds of state defamation law.101
This way of thinking about Hustler, however, is hard to defend. To begin
with, the defamation tort specifically targets expression, while the intentionalinfliction tort does not. This difference is of foundational importance because
it means that defamation laws are not “generally applicable.”102 In contrast,
the intentional-infliction tort simultaneously targets speakers and nonspeakers alike. One might respond to this observation by saying that most cases
of infliction of emotional distress involve speech that generates a “listener
reaction” in the form of emotional upheaval.103 This view of things, however,
is doubtful at best. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example, offers
the following illustration of when a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is available:
A is invited to a swimming party at an exclusive resort. B gives her a
bathing suit which he knows will dissolve in water. It does dissolve
while she is swimming, leaving her naked in the presence of men
and women whom she has just met. A suffers extreme
embarrassment, shame, and humiliation. B is subject to liability to A
for her emotional distress.104
It is apparent that the distress-inducing activity in the naked-swimmer
case does not involve speech.105 Nor do many other actions that trigger the
operation of the intentional-infliction tort.106 For this reason, it is hard to say
that the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress almost

100. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (setting forth actual malice test).
101. See Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 127 (1st Cir. 2000) (reconciling Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. with Hustler on this ground); Garfield, supra note 2, at 1121 (describing Hustler
as impeding the “end-running” of New York Times).
102. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
103. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (indicating that a focus on “listeners’
reactions” correlates with content discrimination).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
105. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (holding that, for conduct to qualify as
speech, there must be “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and a “likelihood [that is]
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it”) (citation omitted).
106. Assume, for example, that an individual secretly and maliciously causes the death of a
neighbor’s beloved dog. Obviously, the heartless dog killer is not subject to a sanction on the
ground that the individual has “spoken” to the dog owner; indeed, the dog owner’s suffering
occurs when the dog dies, an event that may well occur long before the owner even learns of the
brutal neighbor’s involvement.
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always involves speech.107 And this point is all the more salient because the
Court in Hustler never justified its approach to that case on this ground.
So how can it be that the facts of Hustler and O’Brien differ in such a way
that strict scrutiny applies in the former case but not in the latter? In an article
published in 2005, Professor Eugene Volokh sought to answer this question
by setting forth a theory that deals with one major category of problems
concerning generally applicable laws.108 His answer built on the bedrock
notion that laws almost always violate the First Amendment if they penalize
speech based on its content.109 In Police Department v. Mosley, for example, the
Court held that the First Amendment bars the government from outlawing all
forms of picketing—except for labor picketing—near a school.110 Such a law
is content-based on its face because its express terms distinguish between
communication on labor-related and non-labor-related subjects. At the heart
of Professor Volokh’s theory rests the thought that not all content-based laws
work this way. Rather, some laws are content-based as applied.111 In such a case,
the law is generally applicable in the sense that it targets both speakers and
non-speakers in an effort to address a harm that is remediable by the
government. The law gives rise to special free-speech problems, however, to
the extent that it addresses that harm because the harm results from the
content of speech itself.112
Hustler illustrates the point. There, the publisher committed the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of state law. Moreover,
no one questioned the fact that this tort was redressable against non-speakers
because of the government’s interest in protecting victims from outrageous
inflictions of emotional injury. In Hustler itself, however, the publisher was a
speaker. Moreover (and this is the key point), the emotional injury suffered
by Reverend Falwell arose out of the particularly hurtful content of what the
magazine had published. Put another way, the legally remediable harm came
about precisely because Reverend Falwell (unlike, for example, the mortified
naked swimmer) was reacting to particular words and images set forth in a

107. See Volokh, Workplace Harassment, supra note 2, at 1830.
108. See generally Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2.
109. See id. at 1287.
110. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101–02 (1972).
111. Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1286–87.
112. Id. Others (albeit with less elaboration) have endorsed approaches similar to Professor
Volokh’s. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 848 n.56 (“[H]owever a law is written, it may not
constitutionally be applied to punish speech on content-related grounds . . . .”); Post, supra note
2, at 1257–58 (noting that the breach-of-the-peace statute in Cohen v. California “appeared on its
face to be a proper and legitimate regulation of conduct” but that the Court focused on the
statute’s “distinct and separate application to . . . the language of political discourse”). Indeed,
this approach can be seen as having its origins in the Court’s earliest encounters with the Free
Speech Clause. See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1287–88 (discussing the Schenck and
Debs cases, which involved “a generally applicable provision of the Espionage Act”).
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communicated message. Thus, it was Reverend Falwell’s “listener reaction”113
to the content of the speech—that is, his mental response of shock and horror
to the particular expression embodied in the cartoon—that gave rise to his
claimed right of recovery. Because the content of the speech itself caused the
harm that triggered the state-imposed sanction, the law of intentional
infliction of emotional distress was content-based as applied.114
O’Brien is distinguishable from such a case for a simple reason: The
relevant harm caused by the draft-card burner—unlike the relevant harm
caused by Hustler Magazine—had nothing to do with the content of the
defendant’s speech. Instead, the sole harm targeted by the draft-cardmutilation law had to do with the destruction of physical property that served
a useful role in the administration of a government program. To be sure,
O’Brien’s destruction of his draft card involved speech.115 But O’Brien tripped
the switch of the draft-card-mutilation ban without regard to his engagement
in expressive activity. Thus, in contrast to the situation in Hustler, the law in
O’Brien was not content-based as applied.116
Two refinements of Professor Volokh’s analysis merit attention. First,
he does not (and cannot) suggest that governments may never put in place
content-based laws. He acknowledges, in particular, that unprotected
speech—such as incitement or obscenity—is properly subject to prohibition
even though it is the content of such speech that renders it unprotected.117
Volokh also recognizes that courts can validate content-discriminatory laws,
under strict scrutiny analysis, even if those laws do not target traditional
categories of unprotected speech.118 According to Volokh, however, the
government’s ability to restrict speech based on its content by way of generally
applicable laws should reach no further than that; in other words, courts
should permit the content-based-as-applied regulation of speech only to the
extent that (1) the challenged legal restraint targets unprotected expression,
or (2) the legal restraint, as applied, satisfies the strict-scrutiny test.119
113. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
114. See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1291 (discussing Hustler in this same way).
115. See generally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
116. Id. As a matter of legal labeling, one might deal with laws that impose direct-in-effect
burdens on speech by declaring them, for that reason, not to be “generally applicable” in the first
place. Because these restrictions do not single out speakers, however, others have taken a
different approach. See, e.g., Shaman, supra note 2, at 438 (describing Humanitarian Law Project
as involving “a law of general applicability”); Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1288–94
(describing content-based-as-applied laws as “generally applicable”). The more important point
is that, any debate about which of these labels to apply is a tempest in a teapot. The key point is
that the Court should employ consistently whatever terminology it opts to use in light of the
functional distinctions that separate laws that place (1) direct-in-effect; (2) incidental; and
(3) doubly incidental burdens on speech.
117. Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1336, 1347.
118. See id. at 1284, 1347.
119. See id. at 1287, 1348. To be sure, the government has broader freedom to regulate the
content of speech in certain specialized settings, such as in government-run schools and
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By way of example, a generally applicable breach-of-the-peace statute that
covers both expressive and non-expressive activity can operate to prohibit
fighting words because fighting words are a form of unprotected speech. But
such a statute cannot, under Professor Volokh’s approach, similarly operate
on speech that, for example, embodies a problematic rant not “personally
abusive” enough to qualify as fighting words under the present-day
doctrine.120 Moreover, this limitation operates even though the non-fightingwords speech creates a sufficient risk of peace-breaching violence that the
government could prosecute non-speech for triggering exactly the same
degree of risk.
Second, Professor Volokh recognized that some generally applicable laws
that operate to burden speech remain subject to First Amendment challenge
even if they are not content-based as applied.121 This acknowledgement was
hardly surprising because O’Brien endorsed that very point by deeming
“intermediate scrutiny” applicable in many cases that involve no content
discrimination at all.122 This Article will later explore how O’Brien is fairly
subject to criticism, and all the more so in light of the Court’s intervening
free-exercise ruling in Smith.123 For now, however, the critical point is that a
case like Hustler (which involved a content-based-as-applied law) is
distinguishable from a case like O’Brien (which did not involve a contentbased-as-applied law) in a way that helps to explain why the Court applied a
more aggressive form of scrutiny in the former case than in the latter.
This is not to say that the content-based-as-applied principle derived by
Professor Volokh from Hustler and other rulings is uncontroversial, nor that
the principle now operates in as sweeping a way as he posits it should.124
Notably, Volokh’s own survey of the work of lower courts indicates that they
often fail to honor the content-based-as-applied principle—a finding that is
hardly surprising in light of the analytical muddiness of the relevant Supreme
Court precedents.125 Even so, Volokh’s content-based-as-applied principle
sensibly reconciled key rulings of the Court, including Hustler and O’Brien.
Even more important, that approach foreshadowed a major later

workplaces. The problems presented by specialized speech regulation in these settings are
beyond the scope of this Article.
120. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
121. Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1287, 1305.
122. See generally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
123. See infra notes 145–60 and accompanying text.
124. Some observers, for example, have suggested that the direct-in-effect component of the
three-part structure advanced here is inconsistent with the Court’s treatment of speech-based
sexual harassment in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In fact, however, R.A.V. by its
terms addressed only sexual harassment in the form of unprotected fighting words. See Volokh, Speech
as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1293 n.74; Volokh, Workplace Harassment, supra note 2, at 1829–32.
125. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
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development, which came with the Court’s ruling in Humanitarian Law
Project.126
In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court confronted a statute, set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 2339B, that outlawed the giving of material support to terrorist
organizations, including in the form of educational services regarding
peaceable law-reform activities.127 The government contended (in an
argument presented by then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan) that the
challenged statute should escape strict scrutiny on the theory that, as in
O’Brien, it operated in a generally applicable way.128 This approach made
sense, so the government claimed, because § 2339B barred the giving of every
form of material support—valuable arms transfers, valuable food transfers,
valuable information transfers, etc.—in one fell swoop.129 The Court,
however, rejected this position, deeming it necessary to apply a “more
demanding” form of scrutiny than the law in O’Brien had triggered.130 In
reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned:
The Government is wrong that the only thing actually at issue in this
litigation is conduct, and therefore wrong to argue that O’Brien
provides the correct standard of review. O’Brien does not provide the
applicable standard for reviewing a content-based regulation of
speech . . . and § 2339B regulates speech on the basis of its content.
Plaintiffs want to speak to [terrorist organizations], and whether
they may do so under § 2339B depends on what they say. If plaintiffs’
speech to those groups imparts a “specific skill” or communicates
advice derived from “specialized knowledge”—for example, training
on the use of international law or advice on petitioning the United
Nations—then it is barred. See Brief for Government 33–34. On the
other hand, plaintiffs’ speech is not barred if it imparts only general
or unspecialized knowledge. See id., at 32.
The Government argues that § 2339B should nonetheless receive
intermediate scrutiny because it generally functions as a regulation of
conduct. That argument runs headlong into a number of our
precedents, most prominently Cohen v. California. Cohen also involved
a generally applicable regulation of conduct, barring breaches of the
peace. But when Cohen was convicted for wearing a jacket bearing
126. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
127. Id. at 7–8.
128. Id. at 27.
129. Id. at 26–27.
130. Id. at 28. The unsettled character of the law in this area is illustrated by the fact that
lower courts had agreed with the government’s O’Brien-based argument. See, e.g., Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he material support restriction
here does not warrant strict scrutiny because it is not aimed at interfering with the expressive
component of their conduct but at stopping aid to terrorist groups. Compare O’Brien . . . with
Johnson . . . .”).
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an epithet [that read “Fuck the Draft”], we did not apply O’Brien.
Instead, we recognized that the generally applicable law was directed
at Cohen because of what his speech communicated—he violated
the breach of the peace statute because of the offensive content of
his particular message. We accordingly applied more rigorous
scrutiny and reversed his conviction.
This suit falls into the same category. The law here may be described
as directed at conduct, as the law in Cohen was directed at breaches
of the peace, but as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering
coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message. As
we explained in Texas v. Johnson: “If the [Government’s] regulation
is not related to expression, then the less stringent standard we
announced in United States v. O’Brien for regulations of
noncommunicative conduct controls. If it is, then we are outside of
O’Brien’s test, and we must [apply] a more demanding standard.”131
There are four possible ways to reconcile the Court’s application of strict
scrutiny in Humanitarian Law Project with its application of only intermediate
scrutiny in O’Brien: (1) as hinging on the challenger’s planned engagement
in pure expression by way of teaching, as opposed to symbolic speech caught
up with “conduct” as was present in the act of burning a draft card in O’Brien;
(2) as hinging on the statute’s express textual definition of “material support”
to include “training,” thus rendering the challenged law content-based on its
face; (3) as hinging on the government’s concession that the statute applied
only to instruction on “specific” subjects as opposed to “general” subjects; and
(4) as hinging on the proposition that (à la Volokh) the statute was contentbased in its application to the plaintiffs because, as to them, it targeted the
communicative effects of speech.
The first reading would accord fewer protections to symbolic speech than
to “pure speech,”132 even when a challenged law involves content
discrimination.133 This view of the Court’s ruling is off base, however, because
there is no sound reason for distinguishing between these two types of speech

131. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27–28 (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 401 (1989)).
132. David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 152 (2012). See Cox Broad. Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (noting that a newspaper report involved “pure expression”
in overturning application of a rape shield law).
133. Notably, the challengers of the material-support statute in Humanitarian Law Project
themselves relied on this distinction in arguing their case to the Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioners
at 28, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498 & 09-89), 2009 WL
5177142, at *28 (“Courts are somewhat more skeptical of government regulation of ‘pure speech’ than
of expressive conduct . . . .” (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))).
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in applying content-discrimination rules.134 To be sure, some loose-lipped
language of the Court in cases that predated Humanitarian Law Project creates
a measure of confusion on this score.135 But the Court’s logic in Humanitarian
Law Project itself cuts sharply against this would-be distinction for the simple
reason that nothing in that logic suggests that protected speech (at least for
purposes of the content-discrimination principle) falls into two different
categories depending on whether or not it qualifies as “pure.” Indeed, in
defending its application of strict-scrutiny to the case, the Court relied
squarely on Texas v. Johnson—the flag-burning case—which involved not
“pure” speech, but the immolation of a physical object.136
Some commentators have raised the possibility of the second
distinction, which would lay critical weight on the express statutory
identification of “training” as one form of prohibited “material support.”137
Again, however, in Humanitarian Law Project the Court did not hang its hat on
this analytical hook. In particular, the Court made no mention of speechrelated statutory language in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply. To the
contrary, it centered its analysis on Cohen v. California, in which there was no
suggestion that the challenged breach-of-the-peace statute had drawn a

134. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 2, at 492 n.212 (emphasizing the lack of difference between
verbal and nonverbal expression beyond the obvious point that nonverbal expression “more
often falls within the terms of generally applicable regulations”); Williams, supra note 2, at 708
(rejecting the pure-speech/non-pure-speech distinction in part because it has been used by the
Court “almost exclusively as a makeweight”). Indeed, as we have seen, the Court’s classic contentdiscrimination ruling came in a case that involved picketing—a form of “speech brigaded with
action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also supra
note 110 and accompanying text (discussing Mosley case).
135. See supra note 11; see also Post, supra note 2, at 1257 (rejecting the pure-speech/nonpure-speech divide, which has “sometimes confused the Court’s First Amendment doctrine”).
136. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27–28.
137. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1150 (18th ed.
2013) (raising the question whether “it matter[s] that the statute specifically refers to ‘advice’ as
a form of material support”). Notably, the challengers of the material-support statute emphasized
in their brief to the Court that it “contains provisions that are content-based on their face.”
Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al. at 50, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1 (2010) (No. 08-1498 & 09-89), 2009 WL 3865433, at *50 (citing Turner Broad. Sys.
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994) for the proposition that “assertion of a content neutral
purpose [is not] enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content”).
Notably, this distinction might gain some traction from the academic work of then-Professor and
now-Justice Elena Kagan. Kagan suggested that, when lawmakers enact a general prohibition that
applies only in some instances to speech, they will be less likely to bring into play contentdiscriminatory purposes than when they pass laws that target speech per se, even in a contentneutral way. Kagan, supra note 2, at 496. The latter type of law, according to Kagan, will at least
focus the legislative mind on speech effects, thus potentially piquing “hostility or sympathy toward
particular messages.” Id. The former type of law, in contrast, will have a more “covert” effect on
expression, thus reducing the risk of purposeful content discrimination. Id. Based on this idea,
one might say that statutes (such as the material support statute) that deal with speech in express
terms merit more intensive judicial scrutiny, because that treatment raises the odds that
legislators will focus on the resulting chance to suppress unpopular messages.
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distinction on its face between speech-based and non-speech-based peacedisturbing activities.138 In any event, it would be wrong to find a First
Amendment violation in Humanitarian Law Project only because the statutory
text specifically defined “material support” to include “training.” This is so
because, under such an approach, Congress would have been incentivized to
leave out specific references to “training” even though courts would remain
free—if not required—to view such activity as a proscribed form of “material
support.” Put another way, deeming the statute in Humanitarian Law Project to
be content-based solely because of its express mention of training would
glorify form over substance, while rewarding statutory obliqueness and
congressional obfuscation.
The third reading of Humanitarian Law Project—which accords
determinative significance to concessions about the presence of content
discrimination at pages 32–34 of the government’s brief—also fails to carry
the day. In part, this line of analysis falters because the cited government
submission, which noted the legal difference between “specific” and “general”
training, merely echoed the recognized meaning of the material-support
statute itself.139 In any event, this third proposed distinction inevitably
collapses into the fourth. The concessions made by the government were
important, after all, not because they were concessions; they were important
because they confirmed how the statute operated—in particular, that it
operated in a content-discriminatory way. In other words, any supposed
concessions made by the government about “general” and “specific” training
did not themselves trigger strict scrutiny. Rather, they merely confirmed that
the statute was content-based as applied. And it was that proposition that set

138. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27–28; see also Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra
note 2, at 1292 (noting the Court’s similar treatment of other breach-of-the-peace cases,
including in the landmark Edwards v. South Carolina (1963) and Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)
cases). On this score, then-Professor Elena Kagan argued that breach-of-the-peace statutes raise
special dangers that might make content-based-as-applied analysis distinctly justifiable for them.
She noted, in particular, that the “vague standards” established by these laws permit enforcement
officials “to take action based on their views of ideas” and because peace disturbances often result
from speech activities “that raise the ire of the public,” thus creating a de facto (and improper)
“delegation of authority to the public to suppress messages it disfavors.” Kagan, supra note 2, at
462–63. In addition, according to Kagan, history teaches that these laws are especially prone to
abuse when compared to other laws that impose direct-in-effect burdens of “numerous, disparate,
and crosscutting” kinds. Id. at 462. All of these points, it merits emphasis, might have provided a
basis for distinguishing Humanitarian Law Project from Cohen v. California, and for declining to
apply Volokh’s content-based-as-applied principle in the former case. But that is exactly what the
Court did not do in dealing with the material-support statute. (And notably, in Hustler, no less
than in both Humanitarian Law Project and Cohen v. California, the Court paid no attention to any
statutory focus on speech—which obviously was absent with regard to the operative common-law
emotional-distress tort—in finding unconstitutional the state’s application of a generally
applicable law that imposed a direct-in-effect burden on speech. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46–47 (1988).)
139. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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the stage for invoking the content-based-as-applied, strict-scrutiny principle
that Professor Volokh had previously put forward.
Any doubt about the appropriateness of this fourth reading of
Humanitarian Law Project is laid to rest by the Court’s treatment of Cohen v.
California. At bottom, the Court described that case in exactly the way
Professor Volokh would have described it. Yes, the breach-of-the-peace statute
at issue in Cohen v. California sought in general fashion to protect the
tranquility of the community, which the government’s police powers entitled
it to do. Yes, the breach-of-the-peace statute swept up speech with non-speech
in thus safeguarding community tranquility. Yes, the speech-based threat to
community tranquility posed by displays of the F-word could be regarded as
no less severe than pure conduct-based invasions of that tranquility (for
example, through the “buzzing” of pedestrians with low-flying miniature
airplanes). But none of that mattered because Cohen’s alleged breach of the
peace was caused by the audience-distressing content of his speech. Thus, as
the Court explained in Humanitarian Law Project, the law at issue in Cohen v.
California “may be described as directed at conduct . . . [in that it] was directed
at breaches of the peace, but as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering
coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message.”140 For this
same reason, the issue in Humanitarian Law Project was “not whether the
Government . . . may prohibit material support in the form of conduct.”141 It
was “instead whether the Government may prohibit what plaintiffs want to do—
provide material support . . . in the form of speech.”142
Did Professor Volokh’s article lead the Court to analyze the Humanitarian
Law Project case as it did? The Court never cited the article, although the
challenger of the material-support statute had relied on Volokh’s work.143 In
any event, who cares? The important point does not concern whether the
Court meant to track Volokh’s analysis. The important point is that it did track
that analysis, thus vindicating—as a matter of controlling Supreme Court
doctrine—his approach to generally applicable laws that impose direct-ineffect burdens on speech.144
As courts move forward in applying this concept, they would do well to
consider one build-out of Professor Volokh’s theory that seems sensibly
grounded in the logic on which that theory rests. The attractiveness of this
refinement arises because sometimes prohibitions that reach across both
speech and non-speech activities can be unconstitutional based on their
communicative effects even though they are not content-based as applied.
Assume, for example, that a municipality has enacted an ordinance that
140. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 23–27, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1
(2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2010 WL 302209.
144. See Cole, supra note 132, at 152–55 (describing the Court’s analysis in these terms).
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prohibits the placement near a roadway of any object that might cause driver
distraction. Assume also that a court has construed the ordinance to prohibit
the near-road placement of all signage that contains words based on the
rationale that drivers might be distracted by reflecting on the messages those
signs convey. This law, to the extent it operates against word-bearing signs,
would not seem to be content-based as applied because it bars all such signs
without any regard to the content of the messages included on them. Even so,
such a law raises profound First Amendment problems because it wipes out
an entire set of communicative activities and does so because of the mental
reactions that those communicative activities generate. For this reason, the
content-based-as-applied verbiage of Professor Volokh may well fall short in
its effort to capture the full set of cases to which his listener-reaction-centered
principle should logically extend. An alternative articulation of that principle
thus is offered here: At least absent special circumstances, a generally
applicable law is subject to close judicial scrutiny because (1) it is contentbased as applied, or (2) it otherwise directly burdens speech qua speech in its
application to communicative activity. Laws that operate in either of these two
ways stand in marked contrast to generally applicable laws, such as the statute
at issue in O’Brien, that place only incidental burdens on speech. This Article
turns now to an examination of the wide-ranging set of problems presented
by incidental-burden cases.
IV.

INCIDENTAL BURDENS ON SPEECH

Professor Volokh’s article focused on generally applicable laws that merit
strict scrutiny because they impose direct-in-effect burdens on speech. But
what of laws, like the one in O’Brien, that penalize speech only incidentally—
incidentally in the sense that the operation of the challenged law does not
hinge on the communicative impact of the speech? In O’Brien, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a generally applicable law that banned the
destruction of military draft cards. No one questioned that this law operated
in some cases without raising constitutional problems—for example, in its
application to a pyromaniac or to a parent who mutilated a draft card to shield
a child from learning he was subject to induction. In O’Brien itself, however,
prosecutors targeted a political dissident who burned his card as part of a
public protest against the Vietnam War.145 Although the Court upheld the
conviction, it did not exempt generally applicable laws of this kind altogether
from Free Speech Clause attack. To the contrary, the Court considered
whether the law was invalid as applied under a specialized form of

145.

See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367 (1968).
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“intermediate scrutiny.”146 In particular, the Court stood ready to reject a
speaker’s challenge to such a law only
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.147
In short, the Court’s free-speech ruling in O’Brien authorized and invited asapplied challenges to generally applicable laws under the First Amendment.
From O’Brien’s earliest days, its intermediate-scrutiny approach to
incidental-burden, free-speech cases has engendered criticism.148 But the
chorus of boos has grown especially loud in the wake of the Court’s ruling in
Smith.149 That case involved the application of a general criminal prohibition
on peyote use to a religious practitioner who ingested peyote as part of a
sacramental activity recognized by his faith tradition.150 In a landmark ruling,
the Court held—in the face of strong counter-pressures raised by prior
rulings—that no Free Exercise Clause challenge was available to the religious
practitioner because the peyote ban was “a generally applicable criminal
law.”151 Relying on Smith, Justice Scalia later argued that the same no-scrutiny
approach endorsed in Smith for free-exercise cases should carry over to freespeech challenges to generally applicable laws in cases like O’Brien.152 Smith
thus put a bullseye on O’Brien’s back, and later rulings—including Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co.153—have raised additional concerns about O’Brien’s
continued soundness.154 All of these developments have brought to the fore
three key questions about the current status of the O’Brien principle:
(1) Do Smith and other rulings that post-date O’Brien call for
abandonment of its intermediate-scrutiny approach in cases that

146. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 9:17 (2017); see
also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (citing O’Brien as setting forth
an “intermediate level of scrutiny” standard).
147. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
148. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 771.
149. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
150. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
151. Id. at 884. For a treatment of the difficulties the Court faced in sidestepping earlier
authorities, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1109, 1120–28 (1990).
152. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
154. See Bogen, supra note 2, at 222 (questioning whether the Court’s free-speech
jurisprudence has been “moving from an intermediate level of scrutiny toward the absence of
scrutiny adopted in its free exercise decisions”).
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involve generally applicable laws that impose incidental burdens on
speech?
(2) Even if later cases do not dictate an abandonment of O’Brien’s
intermediate-scrutiny rule, do those cases—and particularly Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co.—dictate that courts should now recognize
significant exceptions to that rule?
(3) Regardless of the impact of rulings such as Smith and Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., has the real-world operation of the O’Brien
principle revealed that it has so little speech-protective effect that
retaining it is no longer justifiable?
As the following discussion will reveal, these questions are not subject to quick
and easy answers. To make a long story short, however, the answers to them
turn out to be “no,” “no,” and “no.”
A. THE PRECEDENT-BASED CASE FOR ABANDONING O’BRIEN
Do post-O’Brien rulings of the Supreme Court dictate that the Court
should abandon that decision’s intermediate-scrutiny Free Speech Clause
analysis, thus extending the no-review approach applicable in doublyincidental-burden cases to incidental-burden cases as well? As it turns out, two
separate precedent-based arguments exist for concluding that O’Brien is no
longer good law. One line of argument, which focuses on Free Speech Clause
precedents (prominently including Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.), is considered
and rejected in another work.155 The contention addressed here is the one
based on Smith—namely, that the hands-off approach to free-exercise cases
endorsed by the Court in that case should logically carry over to the freespeech context.
As we have seen, the Court’s ruling in Smith established that a sincere
religious believer engaged in even sacramental activity of central importance
to his faith lacked the ability to challenge on free-exercise grounds the
operation of a generally applicable law.156 In support of this result, Justice
Scalia reasoned that every individual could “become a law unto himself” if
courts had to recognize exceptions to the operation of laws that restrict
specified forms of problematic behavior when that behavior stems from
religious reasons.157 To be sure, Justice Scalia acknowledged the existence of
precedent-driven limits on the no-exemption rule set forth in Smith.158 But the
basic holding endorsed by five Justices had a sharp-edged quality: “[I]f
prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object . . . but merely the

155.
156.
157.
158.

See Dan T. Coenen, Where to, O’Brien? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
Id. at 885 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
See infra notes 312–15 and accompanying text.
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incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the
First Amendment has not been offended.”159
The potential implications of the Court’s free-exercise ruling in Smith are
far-reaching for free-speech law. The essential argument goes like this: If the
Free Exercise Clause does not protect participants in religious activity from
incidental burdens imposed on them by generally applicable laws, the Free
Speech Clause—which is located right next door in the same First
Amendment—should likewise not protect participants in expressive activity
from the incidental burdens imposed on them by exactly those same laws.
There is no apparent textual difference between the Free Exercise Clause and
the Free Speech Clause in this regard. So, if generally applicable laws do not
abridge free-exercise rights for the sole reason that they are generally
applicable (rather than targeted at religion), why should we not say that
generally applicable laws likewise do not abridge free-speech rights because
they are generally applicable (rather than targeted at speech)? The bottom
line, according to this reasoning, is that Smith dictates that O’Brien is no longer
good law. Indeed, Justice Scalia took little time after penning the Court’s
opinion in Smith to advance precisely this position.160 Not surprisingly, several
scholars have agreed that there is no meaningful distinction between freespeech and free-exercise cases in this respect.161

159. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
160. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579–80 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
161. See, e.g., Bogen, supra note 2, at 232–33 (suggesting that O’Brien seems “inconsistent
with Smith,” particularly because of concerns in both contexts “about balancing as a judicial
technique . . . [and] treating people unequally as a result of their subjective intentions.”);
Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 809, 810 n.96 (reasoning that Smith forecloses elevated scrutiny for
generally applicable laws “not only for free exercise but also for free speech” cases, especially
because in “many [cases] free-exercise claims can . . . be recast as [free speech claims],” thus
undermining the Smith rule). For a fortiori arguments for abandoning O’Brien based on Smith, see
Bogen, supra note 2, at 233 (arguing that differential approaches of O’Brien and Smith are
“anomalous” because prohibiting religious acts—including sacramental acts—“has more serious
consequences” than limiting particular modes of expression, which can take other forms), and
Dorf, supra note 2, at 1215 (noting the particularly draconian burden placed on the free-exercise
right in Smith in comparison to the less onerous “particular means” burden imposed in O’Brien)
(quoting Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
5, 27 (1992)). There is also a precedent-based consideration, rooted in pre-Smith, free-exercise
law that may lend support to these a fortiori contentions. This is so because, prior to Smith, the
Court applied the First Amendment even more aggressively in incidental-effect, free-exercise cases
than incidental-effect, free-speech cases. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(applying strict scrutiny), with United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (applying
intermediate scrutiny). All of these a fortiori arguments are weakened, however, by the Court’s
recognition of significant exceptions to its no-review rule in Smith itself, and still more restrictions
in later cases. See generally Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). In the end, Smith at most calls for a thoughtful reexamination of
the relation between free-exercise rights and free-speech rights in incidental-burden cases, and
such a reexamination is set forth in the text that follows.
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Careful examination suggests, however, that there exist strong reasons
for declining to extend the no-review, free–exercise ruling in Smith to O’Brientype free-speech cases. The overarching point is that the Free Exercise Clause
and the Free Speech Clause operate in different contexts to protect different
values.162 In particular, the Court’s ruling in Smith found support in a
distinctive concern about religious-liberty claims—namely, that singling out
religious practitioners for special treatment in applying generally applicable
laws creates a tension with the constitutional norm, rooted largely in the
Establishment Clause, of ensuring the state’s “complete neutrality toward
religion.”163 Stated another way, exempting members of particular religious
traditions from laws that apply to everyone else smacks of advantaging both
religion in general and some religions over others. But a core goal of the First
Amendment is to foreclose exactly this sort of governmental
preferentialism.164 These concerns are not present when it comes to applying
the Free Speech Clause.165 And so it follows that the ruling of Smith does not
easily carry over to the free-speech context.
In addition, the Free Speech Clause plays a distinctly critical role in
ensuring the proper operation of our system of republican self-government.
The capacity of any society to govern itself depends at its root on affording
that society’s members wide-ranging opportunities for criticism (and defense)
of the political and social status quo.166 Given this reality, there is reason to
look with heightened skepticism on any laws that limit free expression.
Notably, the Court has done just that in framing free-speech doctrine—for
example, by developing special liberty-protective rules with regard to

162. See generally Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1298 (“The Free Exercise Clause
and the Free Speech Clause protect different private interests, and courts have long interpreted
them differently.”).
163. Accord Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1989) (reasoning that government
may not “favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 60 (1985); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792–93
(1973) (insisting that “the State . . . pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ toward religion”).
164. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001).
165. In particular, the government is free to promote speech—for example, by creating
designated public forums, subsidizing art, encouraging citizen input with regard to government
decision-making, or disseminating its own preferred messages. On the other hand, whenever the
government promotes religion, it creates tension with the Establishment Clause norm of
neutrality. To be sure, First Amendment principles restrict the government from promoting some
speech over other speech through the use of viewpoint-based or subject-matter-based restrictions.
In contrast to the religion clauses, however, the Free Speech Clause does not condemn the
government’s favoring speech over non-speech as a general matter.
166. Speech—unlike religious practice—often specifically targets with criticism majoritarian
practices and viewpoints, as well as existing political institutions. Given this fact, there is special
reason to fear that political officials—who tend to be political officials precisely because they
adhere to majoritarian viewpoints—will overregulate speech. See, e.g., Stone, Free Speech, supra note
2, at 277 (arguing that the risk of unfairly disadvantaging minorities is “especially potent” in “the
realm of free speech”); id. (“[P]ublic officials will often be sorely tempted to silence dissent in
order to insulate themselves from criticism and preserve their own authority.”).
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overbreadth, vagueness, and prior restraints that do not apply outside the
free-expression context.167 From these points, it does not follow that the freespeech right is more important in all respects than the free-exercise right. It
does follow, however, that the two rights serve different purposes within our
constitutional system.168 Indeed, the Framers foresaw that creation of an open
society made up of citizens with widely divergent world views—that is, just the
sort of open society that an aggressive application of the Free Speech Clause
helps to foster—would itself help to safeguard religious liberty.169 It may well
be for this reason that the Court has declared that freedom of speech “is the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom.”170 Against this backdrop, it makes sense that the Court would apply
the First Amendment with added vigor in assessing state-imposed limits on
speech, including limits that stem from generally applicable laws.171
Free-speech rulings that post-date Smith support this understanding.
Indeed, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court accepted O’Brien as a
relevant precedent and worked hard to show why its principle was not
controlling with respect to the constitutionality of the material-support
statute.172 Other post-Smith rulings likewise proceeded from the premise that
O’Brien remains good law.173 There is, however, a fly in the ointment. As
detailed in Part II, the Court in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. refused to apply any
form of Free Speech Clause scrutiny to a law it deemed generally applicable

167. See generally TRIBE, supra note 2, at §§ 12-27, 12-31, 12-36.
168. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
169. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (noting that, if “you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you [will] make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison) (noting the importance of the expanded republic for this reason, including in
safeguarding “religious rights”).
170. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937); see also Post, supra note 2, at 1272
(noting that “speech is special,” because it “uniquely serves as the precondition to the very
existence of social institutions and practices”).
171. Two other considerations may also contribute to the Court’s distinctive treatment of
free-speech and free-exercise claims in this context. First, application of the no-scrutiny rule in
the free-exercise context greatly reduces the need to make rulings about whether activities stem
from the exercise of “religion.” See Neutral Rules of General Applicability, supra note 2, at 1716–17
(implying that the Smith rule may reflect in part the particular difficulties of “defining religion”).
Second, a regime of compulsory exemptions for religious practices pushes in the direction of
requiring judicial sorting between practices that are “central” or not “central” to one’s religious
life. See id.; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“[T]he principal reason for adopting a strong presumption against [recognizing free-exercisebased exemptions to generally applicable laws] is not a matter of administrative convenience. It
is the overriding interest in keeping the government—whether it be the legislature or the
courts—out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.”).
172. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645, 659 (2000) (distinguishing
O’Brien in invalidating a state public accommodations law as applied to the Boy Scouts’ decision
to exclude an openly gay man from serving as a scoutmaster).
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in character.174 A question thus now exists about how far Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co. goes in limiting the operation of the O’Brien rule.
B. PRECEDENT-BASED LIMITS ON O’BRIEN
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court—with a nod of the
head in the direction of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.—observed that “a generally
applicable law may or may not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the
First Amendment.”175 This passage is rife with obscurity. The context in which
it appeared, however, suggests that the Court meant to say that O’Brien-style
intermediate scrutiny will not apply in every incidental-burden, free-speech
case.176 This same conclusion finds support in the Court’s failure to apply any
form of review in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. itself.177 So just how far does the
exception to O’Brien recognized in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. reach?
The answer to this question is shrouded in uncertainty, but two
possibilities seem worthy of consideration. Under the first approach, courts
would not apply any form of scrutiny in incidental-burden cases (including
O’Brien-style intermediate review) so long as the challenged generally
applicable law imposed a traditionally recognized restriction on individual
liberty.178 Take, for example, the prosecution under a murder statute of an
assassin of a political leader. In such a case, the court might conclude that the
assassination—much like the burning of a flag—in its nature embodies a
publicly communicated expression of opposition to the government. In other
words, an assassination might well be seen as speech under the Court’s
current definition of that term.179 Even so, many analysts would hesitate to
apply O’Brien-based intermediate scrutiny in such a case even if the murder

174. See supra notes 54–90 and accompanying text.
175. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994).
176. The most important feature of the relevant context is that the full citation following the
quoted assertion reads as follows: “compare Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. with Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc.” Id. (citations omitted). This “compare” cite suggests a focus on incidental burden cases
because Barnes involved a generally applicable ban on nudity applied to dancers whose nudity
was deemed to be express behavior, thus triggering analysis by the controlling four-Justice
plurality pursuant to O’Brien.
177. See Garfield, supra note 2, at 1097 (noting that Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. “leaves the
impression that, at least in some instances, a generally applicable law can be immune from First
Amendment scrutiny even if it regulates speech”).
178. See id. at 1088 n.6 (collecting cases, including breach-of-contract cases, in which courts
invoked Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. in rejecting free-speech claims); Kagan, supra note 2, at 491
(positing the unavailability of any First Amendment defense to trespass-law prosecutions); Post,
supra note 2, at 1251–52 (questioning applicability of United States v. O’Brien in some incidentalburden cases, such as when a bus passenger carves political messages onto seats).
179. For an explanation of independently illegal actions and their potential protection under
the First Amendment as free speech, see Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, 1315–16.
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law as applied to the assassin does impose an incidental burden on the freespeech right.180
For some analysts, the reason for this hesitance might lie in the thought
that the Founding Fathers would never have imagined a First Amendment
challenge to a murder law. For others, the driving force might be that,
whatever outlooks held sway in 1791, modern judges should consider “our
tradition” and “longstanding history”181 in developing constitutional-decision
rules.182 For another group of objectors, the reason for skepticism reflects the
thought that some legal prohibitions (beginning with murder laws) are so
central to the social order that they should be deemed constitutionally
unassailable. And for others (including me), the source of hesitance springs
from a more visceral and primal source: It simply makes the skin crawl to think
that an assassin might assert a First Amendment defense to a murder
prosecution.
Before tempers flare at the thought of letting assassins invoke O’Brien,
however, it is worth recalling that exposing a murder law to intermediate
scrutiny hardly means that assassins will go free. Indeed, if any First
Amendment challenge is destined to fail this form of review, it is sure to be
the one put forward by a cold-blooded killer.183 In any event—and whatever
our intuitions might be about the assassin-murder-statute case—there is no
good reason to view Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. as having installed a traditionalprohibition limit on the intermediate-scrutiny rule. Among other things:
(1) not one word in the Court’s opinion assigned significance to the
traditional acceptance of the promissory-estoppel cause of action;184 (2) this
omission was not surprising in light of the relatively recent recognition of the
promissory-estoppel concept and the common law’s long history of not

180. See, e.g., Post, supra note 2, at 1252, 1257 (suggesting that O’Brien does not apply to
“violent crime,” including the act of “a terrorist who is prosecuted for a murder that successfully
communicated a political message”); Schauer, Cuban Cigars, supra note 2, at 787 (“We would not
want to open for [F]irst [A]mendment analysis every criminal prosecution, . . . [such as when]
the defendant claimed that . . . [a] murder was [committed] for political and communicative
purposes.”); see also Kagan, supra note 2, at 498 n.229 (stating she is “sure [that] courts would
decline to apply First Amendment scrutiny to the conviction . . . of a political terrorist for blowing
up the Statue of Liberty”).
181. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 595 (2003).
182. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698 (1972) (relying in part on tradition to reject
constitutionally grounded reporter’s privilege); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 375 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A governmental practice that has become general
throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the validation of long, accepted
usage, bears a strong presumption of constitutionality.”).
183. Indeed, in O’Brien itself the Court concluded that a law prohibiting the destruction of a draft
card was sustainable under intermediate-scrutiny review. To say the least, it should follow a fortiori that
a law prohibiting the destruction of a human being would satisfy that same test. See Dorf, supra note 2,
at 1245 (noting that, even if the First Amendment requires review of murder law as applied to ritual
human sacrifice, “the government will easily meet its justificatory burden”).
184. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671–72 (1991).
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enforcing promises based solely on detrimental reliance (as opposed to
bargained-for consideration);185 (3) significant line-drawing difficulties would
arise under a regime that required judges to distinguish between traditionallyrecognized and not-traditionally-recognized legal restrictions (as Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. itself indicates); and (4) in any event, there was and is no
demonstrable need to embrace a traditional-prohibition exception to O’Brien,
as illustrated by the example of the assassin-murderer case itself, since any
O’Brien-based challenge to the murder law raised by the assassin would
obviously fail.186
So, what is the second way to think about the exception to the O’Brien
rule created by Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.? This question circles us back to the
work of Professor Volokh. In his treatment of generally applicable laws,
Volokh concluded that Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. is best read as rejecting the
defendants’ free-speech-based defense on a narrow ground—namely, on the
ground that the reporter waived any First Amendment rights by way of his

185. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 2.19 (3d ed. 1999) (laying out “the common
law’s traditional view of reliance”).
186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Under another possible view of the Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. limit on access to O’Brien-based review, such review would not extend to a law
(whether traditional or not) so long as it reaches mainly non-speech behavior. The justification
for such an approach is that lawmakers are unlikely to enact such laws out of animus or
insensitivity to speakers; rather, because non-speakers will predictably oppose the passage of such
a restriction, it is unlikely that the legislature will act unless strong justifications for its intervention
exist. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 137, at 1211 (noting that operation of generally
applicable laws on non-speakers may create “political process” dynamics that “will help protect
unpopular speakers” against the enactment of laws that otherwise would burden them); see also
Kagan, supra note 2, at 496 (describing vandalism, tax laws, and zoning laws as having a “breadth
[that] makes them poor vehicles for censorial designs; they are instruments too blunt for
effecting, or even reflecting, ideological disapproval”). Much the same set of problems flagged in
the text for the traditional-prohibition exception, however, would apply to this posited sweepingprohibition exception. See also supra note 131 (noting the Court’s willingness in Humanitarian
Law Project to reaffirm its prior acceptance of as-applied challenge to a breach-of-the-peace
statute, notwithstanding its wide-ranging application to non-speech cases). Another possible
approach—which has a close kinship to the would-be sweeping-prohibition exception—would
distinguish between generally applicable laws based “on the likelihood of a speech-suppressive
administrative motivation.” Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 420. In developing this idea, Srikanth
Srinivasan distinguished Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. from Barnes and O’Brien on precisely this
ground, emphasizing that a private person—and not the government—had initiated the
promissory estoppel suit. Id. (positing that the “unstated underpinning” of the Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co. “decision may well be the impossibility of an illicit administrative motive”); see also
Bogen, supra note 2, at 230 n.111 (offering additional reasons for detecting a greater risk of
speech-suppressive motives in Barnes than Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.). Yet another approach to
limiting O’Brien would be to distinguish between generally applicable laws based on whether they
impose “substantial” or “insubstantial” burdens on speech. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 1182. Both
the would-be insubstantial-danger-of-wrongful-motive approach and the insubstantial-burden
approach to limiting O’Brien are discussed below. See infra notes 324–42 and accompanying text.
These approaches, not surprisingly, pose problems of their own, in part because they would
present courts with difficult sorting tasks and because they are hard to reconcile with key Supreme
Court precedents. See id.
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express agreement not to disclose Mr. Cohen’s identity.187 A major problem
with this waiver theory is that the Court’s wide-ranging treatment of the First
Amendment issue in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. does not offer much support
for it. At the same time, the Court’s meandering analysis does not provide
much (if any) support for any other theory either.188 As a result, there is no
choice but to extrapolate a limit on O’Brien’s operation from what few signals
about the nature of that limit the Court’s analysis in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
supplies.
Against this backdrop, some form of agreement-based waiver theory
probably does the best job of explaining why the Court declined to apply any
First Amendment scrutiny in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. To begin with, the
Court did mention—indeed, it emphasized—the fact that the reporterdefendant had promised not to disclose the plaintiff-source’s name.189 In
addition, the waiver theory has moorings in long-accepted notions of
equitable behavior. Commonly endorsed fairness-based norms—such as not
being able to “have it both ways”190 or to “bait and switch”191 or to avoid
“tak[ing] the bitter with the sweet”192—all were at play in the promissoryestoppel case precisely because it involved foreseeable reliance on a focused
promise that the promisor later willfully breached. In addition, two
considerations tied to the reporter’s voluntary agreement reduced the force
of First Amendment policy concerns in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. First, as a
systemic matter, upholding the promissory-estoppel cause of action may have
advanced, rather than undermined, the animating purposes of the Free
Speech Clause by maximizing the net overall flow of socially useful
information. On this view, by vindicating legal protections for anonymityseeking news sources, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. made it easier for potential
sources to step forward to share information otherwise unavailable to the
public.193 Second, any worry about government suppression of disfavored
speech—that is, the core worry that underlies the free-speech protection—
was at a low ebb in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. Why? Because, as the Court itself
noted, the state sanctioned the defendants for disclosing information in

187. See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1297.
188. Garfield, supra note 2, at 1087 (describing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. as “sloppily
reasoned” and thus exerting an “insidious influence on First Amendment law”); id. at 1125
(describing the Court’s opinion as a “hodgepodge of poorly reasoned explanations”).
189. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665.
190. Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430–31 n.17 (1988).
191. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
192. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153–54 (1974) (plurality opinion).
193. For articles that touch on this idea, see Jerome A. Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media and
Its Significance for First Amendment Law and Journalism, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 419, 456
(1994), and Garfield, supra note 2, at 1087.
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violation of only a purely private agreement, as opposed to an edict handed
down from on high by the rightly watch-dogged institutions of government.194
Even if one concludes that a waiver theory best explains the Court’s
treatment of the free-speech issue in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., it remains to
be asked how far the resulting waiver-based limit on the operation of O’Brien
properly extends. On this point, Professor Volokh may have skipped over a
significant limiting principle. In particular, it may be that a voluntary
agreement not to exercise speech rights does not always preclude the
assertion of First Amendment defenses in a follow-up, breach-of-promise case.
Rather, the best way to view Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. may be to see it as
supporting only a limited waiver exception to O’Brien—that is, an exception
hemmed in by important public-policy considerations.195 Along these lines,
some commentators have called for judicial recognition of constitutional
limits on the enforceability of private employment contracts that broadly bar
the disclosure of information of significant public importance.196 Illustrative
would be a case in which an employee observes a food-seller employer’s
trafficking in germ-infested meat after signing an employment contract that
bars any disclosures about the employer’s business practices. Notably, in such
a case, some key waiver-based justifications for barring the defendants from
challenging the promissory-estoppel law in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. are not
applicable. To begin with, any disclosure of information about germ-infested
meat would not bring into play the same “bait-and-switch” concerns raised by
breaching a focused promise not to disclose a highly discrete piece of
information concerning only an informant’s name.197 In addition, the
rationale rooted in fostering the overall flow of newsworthy information, by
enforcing reporters’ promises not to disclose a source’s name, has no
194. See Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 419–20 (focusing on private, as opposed to state,
enforcement decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.).
195. See Garfield, supra note 2, at 1126 (expressing worries about a waiver principle that
would “extend a welcome mat for private parties, and particularly businesses, to shut down the
flow of embarrassing information by wrapping that information in a veil of property and contract
rights”). Some support for this view comes from Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
There, a former CIA agent breached a promise to allow the agency to review any written materials
concerning the agent’s work prior to publication. Id. at 508. The Court’s analysis focused on
remedial issues. Id. at 514. The agent, however, had also challenged enforcement of the promise
itself as inconsistent with the First Amendment. See id. at 509 n.3. Notably, the Court did not
respond to this argument by declaring, without more, that Snepp had waived his rights
“voluntarily.” Id. It went on to emphasize that the particular agreement was supported by “a
compelling interest in protecting . . . the secrecy of information important to our national
security” and that “[t]he agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable means for protecting this
vital interest.” Id.
196. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 2, at 1119–20 (raising the contention that, despite Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., waiver law should give way in free-speech cases because at stake are not only “the
interests of the speaker but also those of the public which is deprived of the information”); id. at
1114 (noting that enforcement of nondisclosure agreements is especially problematic when
there are no “alternative channels for communication of the information”).
197. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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application whatsoever in cases such as the one involving germ-infested meat.
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., after all, the whole point of promising not to
disclose a source’s identity was to obtain information that otherwise would not
be available to the public. But no such non-speech-for-more-speech tradeoff
is in the picture in cases that involve only the enforcement of standard
employment contracts.
At the least, breach-of-promise cases like the one involving germ-infected
meat raise public-policy concerns that some courts are sure to deem
significant as they wrestle with waiver-related First Amendment issues. And
that fact alone suggests that whatever exception Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
overlays on O’Brien is likely to prove to be a narrow one. After all, if courts balk
at applying even a waiver-centered exception to cases involving explicit
promises not to speak, there is good reason to believe that they will hesitate
to extend that exception to cases that do not involve claims of waiver at all.
C. ABANDONING O’BRIEN ON POLICY GROUNDS
The preceding discussion shows that recent decisions of the Court do not
support abandoning O’Brien’s intermediate-scrutiny approach for generally
applicable laws that only incidentally burden speech.198 That fact, however,
does not mean that applying intermediate scrutiny to such laws is a good idea.
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., for example, Justice Scalia argued that the Court
should extend the Smith no-review rule to incidental-burden, free-speech
cases based in part on specialized normative grounds.199 The thrust of his
argument was that social-order concerns that favor across-the-board
compliance with legal restrictions carry special weight in the free-speech
context because “almost anyone can violate almost any law as a means of
expression.”200 As earlier analysis suggests, however, there are countervailing
considerations that lend support to just the opposite approach. According to
this line of analysis, the centrality of the free-speech right to a successful
system of self-rule logically supports a judicial stance that directs especially
meaningful scrutiny of generally applicable laws that impose burdens on
communicative (as opposed to religious) liberty.201
Faced with this clash of normative arguments, lower courts might hesitate
to push aside the analysis put forward by Justice Scalia. But in this instance,
they should not hesitate at all. The reason why is that Justice Scalia found
himself writing in Barnes only for himself. No other Justice expressed even a
hint of support for his view that the Court should abandon the longrecognized approach of O’Brien; indeed, each of them readily applied the

198.
199.
200.
201.

See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text.
Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572, 576–79 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 579.
See supra notes 152–88 and accompanying text.
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principles of O’Brien in deciding the issue put forward in Barnes.202 In short,
Justice Scalia’s policy argument for abandoning O’Brien was aired before the
full Court, and the Court declined to embrace it.
There is, however, another normative argument—one not advanced by
Justice Scalia—for doing away with O’Brien’s intermediate-scrutiny
methodology. This argument rests on the idea that the O’Brien-style
intermediate-scrutiny rule is so feckless in actual operation that there is no
good reason to keep it in place.203 The case for viewing the O’Brien rule as an
empty vessel begins with O’Brien itself, in which the Court—even while
applying intermediate scrutiny—had no difficulty upholding the challenged
draft-card-mutilation law. Likewise, in Barnes and other post-O’Brien cases the
Court has validated challenged statutes when called on to apply the O’Brien
test.204 In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Court also created an indeterminate
exception to O’Brien that threatens further confusion by rendering its
intermediate-scrutiny principle inapplicable in an as-yet-undefined set of
incidental-burden cases.205 Thus, so the argument goes, any benefits that
O’Brien might otherwise yield are overwhelmed by the real-world costs it
creates in requiring courts to process cases that are almost certain to fail—
costs that are significant in terms of undermining certainty in the law,
efficiency in its operation, and the consistent treatment of litigants.206 It
follows, so the argument concludes, that the Court should abandon the
O’Brien approach on normative grounds, regardless of any precedent-based
challenge to it under Smith and other authorities.
For at least three reasons, this argument is unpersuasive. First, in a variety
of contexts (albeit ones that do not involve typical incidental-burden cases),
the Court has found that statutes challenged under the First Amendment do
fail the intermediate-scrutiny test, thus demonstrating that the application of
this mode of review can be more—indeed, much more—than a make-work
exercise.207 Second, the sample size of Supreme Court decisions that directly
202. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566–72.
203. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 945 (making the case that elimination of review for
noncommunicative-effect cases—including cases such as O’Brien—“would not have a great impact
because [such] challenges . . . almost never succeed”); Neutral Rules of General Applicability, supra
note 2, at 1726 n.76 (describing O’Brien test as now “functionally useless”).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
205. See supra notes 52–90 and accompanying text.
206. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 495 (arguing with respect to “all laws incidentally restricting
speech,” that “[i]f, as seems likely, most of the laws would pass constitutional muster, incurring
[the] costs” of individualized judicial assessments of constitutionality “does not seem worthwhile,”
so that courts should “assume from the outset that these laws raise no serious problem”).
207. See, e.g., Bogen, supra note 2, at 255–58 (citing Turner Broadcasting and commercial
speech cases as illustrative of how the Court has applied the O’Brien test in an “invigorated” way
and “can examine laws closely” under that standard); Dorf, supra note 2, at 1201 n.101 (noting
the Court’s recent receptiveness to “a more stringent form of intermediate scrutiny” for contentneutral laws). For some rulings that have invalidated laws pursuant to O’Brien-type intermediate-
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involve O’Brien is small, and lower courts in fact have repeatedly struck down
laws under the banner of O’Brien’s intermediate-scrutiny approach.208 Finally,
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.—the case that will take center stage in the
remainder of this Article—signals that intermediate scrutiny of generally
applicable laws pursuant to the O’Brien principle is far more than a
meaningless act.209 In that case, the New York Court of Appeals invoked
O’Brien in overturning the state’s closing of a bookstore because episodes of
unlawful conduct had occurred on its premises.210 The Supreme Court
reversed, but it did so only because it declined to apply the O’Brien standard,
while never questioning the lower court’s determination that intermediate
scrutiny required it to afford the bookstore owners with judicial relief. Arcara,
in short, illustrates that the Court neither does, nor should, view intermediate
scrutiny under O’Brien as so impotent that it should be abandoned.
To be sure, one might argue that the case for discarding the O’Brien rule
gains (rather than loses) force in light of Arcara because that ruling, like the
ruling in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., creates a range of cases in which the O’Brien
rule does not apply at all. This argument, however, suffers from problems of
its own. To begin with, Arcara creates a limiting principle that reaches only
cases in which a generally applicable rule imposes a doubly incidental burden
on expression. Because many cases—including O’Brien itself—involve
incidental (rather than doubly incidental) burdens on speech, the principle
of that case still has much work to do. In any event, as the next Part of this
Article shows, the Arcara rule itself has spawned a complex mix of exceptions
that in practical effect extend the operation of O’Brien to many doublyincidental-burden cases. The next part of this Article considers the nature of
the rule established by Arcara and the many exceptions to that rule that postArcara judicial decisions and scholarly commentary have advanced.
V.

DOUBLY INCIDENTAL BURDENS ON SPEECH

The dispute in Arcara centered on a New York statute that authorized the
closing of any business that served as a site for prostitution and other forms of

scrutiny analysis, see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (applying O’Brien
test to “must carry” rule applied to cable television operators and remanding for more careful
review); and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (invalidating prison mail restriction
pursuant to the O’Brien test).
208. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 497 n.226 (noting that O’Brien-based intermediate scrutiny
“has the potential to matter”); Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 407 (noting that “[t]he Court would
likely engage in a more searching inquiry of incidental effects in some circumstances”—a point
of importance because lower courts will have more opportunities than the Supreme Court to
operate in this way); Williams, supra note 2, at 708 n.344 (asserting that: (1) “O’Brien, on its face,”
does not set forth a “toothless” test; and (2) “the Court often has allowed lower federal courts to
apply the O’Brien test fairly strictly”).
209. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
210. See id. at 698–99.
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lewd behavior.211 Based on this statute, the trial court closed an adult
bookstore because persons on the premises, with the knowledge of the store’s
operator, had offered to sell sexual services and openly engaged in
masturbation and fellatio.212 The New York Court of Appeals overturned the
trial court’s order.213 It reasoned that the law, as applied in this case, failed
the “less restrictive means” prong of the O’Brien test because an injunction
that barred only the lewd activities themselves would adequately address the
evils the state sought to remedy.214
The Supreme Court disagreed. It concluded that the limiting principle
of O’Brien did not apply at all on the facts presented, so that neither
intermediate scrutiny nor any other form of Free Speech Clause review was
operative in the case.215 The Court reasoned that O’Brien was distinguishable
because it involved the penalizing of conduct—namely, the mutilation of a
draft card, a public protest that itself embodied a “significant expressive
element.”216 In contrast, the prostitution and open sexual activities subject to
sanction in Arcara involved “no element” of expressive behavior, so O’Brien
was beside the point.217
The majority rooted its drawing of this distinction in a parade-ofhorribles rationale. It noted, for example, that a person subjected to a money
damages award in a civil suit might thereby become far less able to publish
political messages.218 But it could not be the case that the risk of a civil
damages award in any sort of tort or breach-of-contract lawsuit would generate
a potential First Amendment defense.219 In a concurring opinion, Justice
O’Connor made the same point, describing such a result as “absurd.”220
Surely, she explained, the arrest of a reporter for a traffic violation should not
trigger First Amendment scrutiny even if (to build out her thought) that arrest
would impede the reporter’s ability to arrive on time for an important
newscast.221 Arcara, a majority of the Court concluded, was indistinguishable
from cases like the one involving the delayed reporter because lewdness (like
speeding) did not embody protected expression and the statutory closure
remedy applied to any business, not just bookstores.

211. Id. at 698.
212. Id. at 699.
213. Id. at 701.
214. Id. at 701–02.
215. Id. at 706–07.
216. Id. at 706.
217. Id. at 705.
218. See id. at 706.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 708 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
221. See id.; see also Dorf, supra note 2, at 1178 (noting the “obvious constitutionality” of some
laws that have doubly incidental effects on expression, including environmental and minimum
wage laws applied to newspaper publishers).
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In short, Arcara launched a new principle that recognized and responded
to a third type of generally applicable law. Arcara did not involve a direct-ineffect burden on speech (as in Humanitarian Law Project) or an incidental
burden on speech (as in O’Brien) because the sanctioned conduct (namely,
prostitution and lewdness) did not involve speech at all. Rather, to use the
rhetoric put forward in this Article, the case involved only a doubly incidental
burden on expression, and the Court concluded that this sort of burden
triggered no First Amendment scrutiny whatsoever.
The story of Arcara, however, did not end there. To begin with, the case
produced a vigorous dissent. In an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, Justice Blackmun decried the Court’s failure to apply any scrutiny
at all to a law that had the practical effect of closing down an entire bookstore
engaged overwhelmingly in protected First Amendment activity.222 The
majority seemed ready to tolerate this result because it would bring to this
sprawling field of law the benefits of a bright-line, state-protective rule. The
dissenters, however, emphasized the costs that such a wooden approach
would impose:
The Court’s decision creates a loophole through which counties . . .
can suppress “undesirable,” protected speech without confronting
the protections of the First Amendment. Until today, the Court has
required States to confine any book banning to materials that are
determined, through constitutionally approved procedures, to be
obscene. Until today, States could enjoin the future dissemination
of adult fare as a nuisance only by “adher[ing] to more narrowly
drawn procedures than is necessary for the abatement of an ordinary
nuisance.” A State now can achieve a sweeping result without any
special protection for the First Amendment interests so long as the
predicate conduct—which could be as innocent as repeated
meetings between a man and a woman—occurs on the premises. . . .
[W]hen a State’s only intention is to eliminate sexual acts in public,
a 1-year closure has a severe and unnecessary impact on the First
Amendment rights of booksellers.223
Perhaps in response to this expression of alarm, the majority recognized
an exception to Arcara in Arcara itself: Its limiting principle would not apply
when the challenged law had the “inevitable effect” of singling out protected
speech for adverse treatment.224 The Court in Arcara also in effect recognized
another exception, derived from its earlier decision in United States v.
Albertini,225 by indicating that the O’Brien rule would remain operative so long
222.
223.
224.
Arcara).
225.

See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 708–09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 711–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 706–07. See generally infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the inevitable-effect exception to
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
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as an “intimate relation” exists between non-speech activity targeted by a
generally applicable law and separate activity subject to First Amendment
protection.226 Post-Arcara rulings also have signaled the Court’s willingness to
review speech-restricting laws in another set of doubly-incidental-burden
cases—in particular, when the legislature’s purpose in enacting a generally
applicable law is to stamp out protected forms of speech.227 In addition, the
Court has issued doctrinal pronouncements in other fields of constitutional
law—with regard to the so-called “hybrid rights”—that lay the groundwork for
recognition of yet another exception to Arcara.228 Lower court judges have
joined in this effort too, asserting that Arcara should not control in (1) cases
in which the generally applicable law regulates concededly lawful activity, as
opposed to activity that is wrongful and therefore prohibited229 and (2) cases
in which the generally applicable law targets communicative activity not
protected by the First Amendment (such as obscenity) as opposed to noncommunicative activity not protected by the First Amendment (such as
prostitution).230 Finally, thoughtful commentators have proposed approaches
that would significantly limit Arcara’s reach. According to Michael Dorf,
courts should abandon Arcara’s no-review approach whenever the challenged
law imposes a “substantial” burden on speech.231 And Srikanth Srinivasan has
advanced a theory under which courts should refrain from applying Arcara
when they detect an intolerably high risk that content discrimination is afoot
in the operation of the challenged law.232
This Article cannot provide a full review of each of these actual or
potential carve-outs from the Arcara rule. Even so, a quick assessment is
offered here for two reasons. First, these exceptions are themselves important
features of the overarching architecture of Free Speech Clause limits on
generally applicable laws. Second, the number, scope, and complexity of
these limits raise questions about whether the Court’s current approach to
doubly-incidental-burden cases has become so unstable that it is unlikely to
endure. At the least, a brief look at the law in this area leaves no doubt that
this question is deserving of serious, continuing reflection.
The exceptions to Arcara set forth above fall into four categories:
(1) exceptions already endorsed by the Supreme Court; (2) exceptions put
forward by lower courts; (3) exceptions potentially derived from Supreme
Court doctrines not yet explicitly tied to Arcara; and (4) exceptions proposed
by legal scholars. The remainder of Part V shows that each of these categories
raises questions of interest and importance.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See infra Part V.A.2 (discussing the intimate-relation exception).
See infra Part V.A.3 (discussing the improper-purpose exception).
See infra Part V.C (discussing the hybrid-rights exception).
See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the lawful activity exception).
See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the unprotected-speech exception).
See infra Part V.D.2 (discussing the substantial-effects exception proposed by Dorf).
See infra Part V.D.1 (discussing bad-purpose-prophylaxis exception proposed by Srinivasan).
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A. EXCEPTIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE SUPREME COURT
1. The Inevitable-Effect Exception
The Court in Arcara endorsed in express terms one exception to the rule
set forth in that case: Judges would continue to apply elevated First
Amendment scrutiny when a generally applicable regulation of
“nonexpressive activity has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged
in expressive activity.”233 The Court grounded this exception in its earlier
ruling in Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue,234 where it had struck down “a tax imposed on the sale of large
quantities of newsprint and ink because the tax had the effect of singling out
newspapers.”235 Although “the tax was imposed upon a nonexpressive
activity,” its burden “inevitably fell disproportionately—in fact, almost
exclusively—upon the shoulders of newspapers exercising the constitutionally
protected freedom of the press.”236 In contrast, the anti-lewdness law at issue
in Arcara, like most “governmental regulations of general applicability,”237 did
not “impose a disproportionate burden upon those engaged in protected First
Amendment activities.”238 Therefore, it fell outside the reach of the Minnesota
Star principle.239
The inevitable-effect exception, not surprisingly, has given rise to difficult
line-drawing problems.240 One lower court case, for example, concerned a socalled anti-paparazzi law, which requires the imposition of heightened
punishments for traffic offenses motivated by a driver’s desire to obtain
information for personal gain.241 Does such a law fall within the Minnesota Star
233. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986).
234. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
235. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704 (citation omitted).
236. Id. at 704.
237. Id. at 705.
238. Id. at 704.
239. Id. at 705.
240. For example, in Forbes v. City of Seattle, the Washington Supreme Court considered a First
Amendment challenge to a local ordinance that levied a five percent tax on all admission fees
collected by local businesses. Forbes v. City of Seattle, 785 P.2d 431, 432–33 (Wash. 1990). The
court examined, in particular, whether the ordinance “targets a subgroup of First Amendment
activities (here, motion picture theaters) for taxation,” in a way that made it subject to scrutiny
under Minneapolis Star. Id. at 435 (citations omitted). In the end, the court found the Minneapolis
Star principle inapplicable, but distinguished one earlier case in which a generally phrased
admission tax in practice reached only the challenger’s business, and another case in which “90
percent of the admissions tax was borne by four businesses, all of which were engaged in protected
speech.” Id. at 436 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The court emphasized that the law
in Forbes operated in a different manner because under it several hundred businesses were subject
to taxation, only two dozen of which were movie theaters, which accounted for only 20% of total
tax revenues. Id. What if, however, speaker-taxpayers in Forbes had accounted for 60%, 70%, or
80% of tax payments? The question highlights the inherent difficulty of applying the inevitableeffect principle.
241. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2016).
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exception because it most often applies to news gatherers? Or is the exception
inapplicable because the law targets not only news gatherers but also private
investigators or other persons seeking information for pay? A California
appellate court concluded that the statute was constitutional, rejecting the
argument that it singled out speakers “as a practical matter.”242 In doing so,
the court reasoned that “taking photographs and making recordings for
personal gain are not always or necessarily journalistic activities” because such
activities might be pursued by a private eye or a blackmailer.243 This argument
is hardly airtight, however, because private eyes and blackmailers—no less
than paparazzi journalists—may well seek and secure photographs and sound
recordings to facilitate follow-up communicative activities.244
Anti-paparazzi statutes highlight the difficulty of applying the Minnesota
Star principle across a complex range of generally-applicable-law cases.245
Moreover, this difficulty is heightened by the rhetoric of Arcara itself. The
problem arises because the majority in that case described the sort of laws
stripped of protection by Minneapolis Star with a hodgepodge of verbal
constructs—speaking of “a disproportionate burden” on speakers at one
point;246 “the inevitable effect of singling out” speakers at another;247 and
consequences that “fall disproportionately—in fact, almost exclusively” on

242. Raef v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159, 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
243. Id. at 167.
244. Perhaps a better explanation of the result in the case rests on the long-recognized
distinction between gathering information and communicating information to others. See, e.g.,
Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to
Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 265–72 (2004) (noting decisions
that afford more First Amendment protection to communicative activities than to news-gathering
activities). The court in Raef, however, did not make this distinction the centerpiece of its analysis.
245. In another case, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied Arcara’s noscrutiny rule after a local government wielded its eminent domain power to close an adult theatre
as part of an effort to rehabilitate a blighted three-block area located downtown. In re
Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Auth., 913 A.2d 178, 186–87 (Pa. 2006). The court,
however, noted that it would have reached a different result—apparently under the Minneapolis
Star principle—if no other adult theatres were able to operate in the city. Id. at 186. But how far,
in spinning out this thread, would the court go? What if, for example, one other theatre was in
operation but it lay on the outskirts of a large city in which cross-town driving was uncommon?
What if the city were extremely large—the size, perhaps, of Seattle or Milwaukee—and only two
or three such establishments operated within its boundaries? What if the city were small, no other
theatres operated within its boundaries, but theatres did operate in neighboring towns? With
regard to this last question, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), a town
in New Jersey sought to sanction a business that featured nude dancing for breaching a local
zoning restriction that prohibited “live entertainment.” Id. at 63–64. On appeal, one justification
offered by the city in support of the ordinance was that nude dancing venues operated in
surrounding areas. Id. at 64. The Court, however, rejected this argument, stating that “[o]ne is
not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place.” Id. at 76–77 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 163 (1939)).
246. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704 (1986).
247. Id. at 707.

A2_COENEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

1/7/2018 10:49 PM

FREE SPEECH AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

481

speakers at yet another.248 Uncertainty-creating linguistic formulations are
inescapable in law. But uncertainties are compounded for no good reason
when the Court states the same principle in shifting terminology in the
process of declaring that principle’s existence.
2. The Intimate-Relation Exception
In Arcara, the Court distinguished O’Brien on the ground that there
“the ‘nonspeech’ which drew [the] sanction was intimately related to expressive
conduct protected under the First Amendment.”249 As we have seen in O’Brien
itself, the intimate relationship that existed between protected speech and
unprotected conduct was self-evident because—as the Court put the point in
Arcara—“it was conduct with a significant expressive element that drew the legal
remedy . . . .”250 In another pre-Arcara ruling, however, the Court signaled that
the limits imposed by O’Brien do not apply only when the generally applicable
law takes aim at protected speech itself. United States v. Albertini arose out of
the proper issuance by military authorities of a so-called “bar letter” that
prohibited the defendant from reentering Hickam Air Force Base without a
grant of specific permission issued by military authorities.251 A federal statute
criminalized the violation of such bar letters regardless of the reason for
entry.252 Even so, Albertini came onto the base without permission to
participate in a political demonstration.253 In response to the ensuing federal
prosecution for this conduct, he argued that his entry onto the base in
violation of the bar letter was protected by the First Amendment.254 The Court
rejected this argument, but in doing so it did not declare, along the lines of
Arcara, that the Free Speech Clause had no role to play; rather, it applied
intermediate scrutiny pursuant to O’Brien.255 Of even greater importance for
present purposes, the Court in Arcara itself distinguished Albertini without
questioning in any way the Court’s application in that case of O’Brien-style
review.256 Put another way, the Court in Arcara recognized an exception to the
Arcara rule—wholly separate from the Minnesota Star exception—rooted in
Albertini.
248. Id. at 704.
249. Id. at 706 n.3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
250. Id. at 706 (emphasis added). See also id. at 702 (describing O’Brien as a case in which “the
otherwise unlawful burning of a draft card was to ‘carry a message’”); id. at 705 (distinguishing the law
challenged in Arcara from the one challenged in O’Brien on the ground that “the sexual activity carried
on in this case manifests absolutely no element of protected expression”).
251. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 677 (1985). As the Court noted, the Air Force
issued the bar letter against Albertini because he and a companion “obtained access to secret Air
Force documents and destroyed the documents by pouring animal blood on them.” Id.
252. Id. at 677–78.
253. Id. at 678–79.
254. Id. at 679.
255. Id. at 688–89.
256. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 703 (1986).
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What is the nature of this exception? Or (to put the same question
differently), how did Albertini differ from O’Brien in such a way that it gave rise
to a major extension of the O’Brien intermediate-scrutiny principle that the
Court in Arcara carried forward? The answers to these questions hinge on one
key fact—namely, that the actus reus of the crime in Albertini involved merely
entering the grounds of the base.257 This fact is of critical significance because
the act of entering the base did not (in contrast to O’Brien’s burning of his
draft card) embody communicative behavior.258 Rather, the relevant
expressive behavior came only later, when Albertini thrust himself into the
on-base demonstration. For this reason, Albertini reflected a significant
expansion of O’Brien, and (as a result) a significant limitation on the no-review
principle made applicable by Arcara to doubly-incidental-burden cases.
The Court in Arcara posited that this limitation would operate in cases
where the statutorily prohibited conduct was “intimately related” to one’s
engagement in protected speech. But just how far does this “intimate relation”
exception to the Arcara rule extend? One possibility is to say that conduct
undertaken to facilitate expressive activity is ipso facto “intimately related” to
that activity, so that generally applicable laws that outlaw such facilitative
activity must survive intermediate scrutiny notwithstanding Arcara.259 A
principle this broad in scope, however, would plainly reach too far.260 Indeed,
the hypothesized case that involved unlawful speeding by a late-running news
reporter—that is, the very case put forward by Justice O’Connor as a
paradigmatic example of when Arcara’s no-scrutiny rule has to apply—itself
involved interference with action undertaken to facilitate the engagement in
protected speech.261 Perhaps Albertini stands for the proposition that securing
physical access to a site of speech should automatically qualify as intimately
related to that speech. Such a principle would, however, produce
discomforting results as well. Why, for example, should O’Brien, rather than
Arcara, apply to the operation of a generally applicable trespass law that bars

257. See Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 412 (noting that, because “Albertini did not begin his
protest until after he had illegally reentered the base, the conduct that drew application of the
law (the initial reentry) was not itself expressive”); Stone, supra note 2, at 110 (observing that
reentry, not speech, triggered the sanction in Albertini).
258. Kagan, supra note 2, at 498 n.228 (noting that “the reentry . . . was not itself expressive”).
259. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 1206 (discussing the facilitation of speech as a trigger for First
Amendment scrutiny); Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 413 (noting that one could “interpret the
Arcara rule so that it would accommodate Albertini” by holding that a law is worthy of scrutiny
when it “facilitates some expressive activity”); Williams, supra note 2, at 723–24, 727 (suggesting
that elevated review should sometimes apply to interferences with “facilitative aspects of speech”).
260. See Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 413 (challenging the proposed facilitation-based exception).
261. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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unauthorized entry onto my property simply because the trespasser wants to
stand on my porch to denounce my political views?262
There is also no self-evident reason why the intimate-relation exception
should apply only to activities that facilitate speech. Why, for example, should
exiting property be distinguished from entering property? It seems odd to say,
for example, that an Albertini-like base-invader can mount a First Amendment
defense to a prosecution for improperly scaling a fence to join a political
demonstration but not to a prosecution for exiting exactly the same base over
exactly the same fence after exactly the same demonstration is over. The
overarching point is that the “intimate relation” exception hangs over the
Arcara principle in an uncertainty-engendering way.263 As with the “inevitable
effect” exception of Minnesota Star, the intrinsic amorphousness of the term
“intimately related” opens the door for innovative judicial efforts to restrict
the operation of Arcara’s no-review rule.264
3. The Improper-Purpose Exception
In Arcara, the majority emphasized that a person who encountered the
application of an otherwise unobjectionable generally applicable law could
assert a First Amendment claim if the government’s action stemmed from a
wrongful speech-targeting purpose.265 One set of improper-purpose cases
involves the wrongful speech-suppressing enforcement of a generally
applicable law. In State ex rel. Konstam v. Video Visions, Inc., for example, the
Ohio Court of Appeals confronted the closure of an adult bookstore, based
on known acts of masturbation in video booths, pursuant to an ordinance that
authorized the shutting down of business establishments wherever such acts
of “lewdness” occurred.266 Not surprisingly, the State resisted the bookstore
operator’s First Amendment defense by invoking Arcara, which at first blush
seemed to control the case in a directly-on-point fashion.267 Things became
trickier, however, when the “[a]ppellants produced overwhelming evidence
that the nuisance investigation against Video Visions was pretextual in

262. See Schauer, Cuban Cigars, supra note 2, at 787 (questioning the application of
intermediate scrutiny in “every trespass prosecution . . . solely because the trespasser trespassed
for the purpose of communicating”).
263. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2, at 724 (“There is . . . no clear dividing line between
facilitative aspects of speech and other activities.”).
264. See, e.g., Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1058–59, 1064 (7th Cir.
2004) (invalidating a youth curfew law under the Free Speech Clause in part because leaving
home was a “necessary precursor” to engaging in speech activities).
265. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1986); see also id. at 708 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“If . . . a city were to use a nuisance statute as a pretext for closing down a bookstore
because it sold indecent books . . . the case would clearly implicate First Amendment concerns and
require analysis under the appropriate First Amendment standard of review.”).
266. State of Ohio ex. rel. Konstam v. Video Visions, Inc., No. 93-CA-38, 1994 WL 167925,
at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1994).
267. Id. at *3.
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nature.”268 Specifically, the town had repeatedly failed in earlier efforts to
obtain criminal obscenity convictions against the store’s operators; its
governing council had then brought in experts to provide advice on “dealing
with pornography problems”; and the nuisance investigation directed at the
bookstore “was instituted immediately after” the council instructed local
enforcement authorities to take action “to fight ‘hard-core’ pornographic
materials.”269 On these facts, the Ohio court concluded that Arcara did not
preclude, but instead supported, defendants’ First Amendment challenge.270
Put another way, the court recognized that an improper purpose in bringing
an enforcement action—here to root out protected “pornography,” as
opposed to unprotected “obscenity”—would render unconstitutional the
application of a law otherwise unobjectionable under the principle of
Arcara.271
A second type of improper-purpose problem concerns not the
enforcement, but the adoption, of generally applicable laws. Assume, for
example, that no anti-lewdness law was on the books prior to the events that
gave rise to State ex rel. Konstam. Assume further that the city council enacted
a new anti-lewdness law because it was unhappy with Video Vision’s operations
(even though it purveyed no obscenity) and that the legislative record showed
that the council took this action “just so we can keep such places from selling
pornographic filth.” Assume finally that an enforcement officer, with no
speech-related motives at all, thereafter brought a proceeding to shut down
the business upon discovering that an open act of masturbation had occurred
on site. Would Video Visions have a First Amendment defense against the
city’s action?
Of no little importance with respect to this question, the Court in O’Brien
itself declared that “this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”272 This rhetoric,
however, stands in no small tension with the Court’s more recent free-speechlaw pronouncements, which suggest that strict scrutiny applies whenever “the
purpose and justification for the law are content based.”273 In addition, a

268. Id. at *4.
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
273. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015); see also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). For additional Free Speech Clause authorities along these
lines, see Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with SecondLook Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1760 n.784 (2001); Theodore
Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 36, 99–156 (1977) (analyzing in detail how the Court approaches the issue of
impermissible legislative motives); Farber, supra note 2, at 745 n.94 (critiquing O’Brien’s failure
to recognize improper legislative purpose as a basis for invalidating statutes); Kagan, supra note
2, at 427 n.43 (citing recent motive-based regimes); and Schauer, Cuban Cigars, supra note 2, at
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never-consider-legislative-purpose principle is hard to square with postO’Brien rulings under the Equal Protection,274 Establishment,275 and Free
Exercise276 Clauses.277 To be sure, the difficulty of deciphering the shared
purposes of a multi-member legislative body278 counsels against judicial
adventurism in making findings of wrongful motives.279 Even so, under the
full corpus of present-day law, there can be little doubt that courts would
hesitate to apply the immunity otherwise bestowed by Arcara when
“overwhelming evidence” indicates that lawmakers passed the challenged law
with the specific purpose of extinguishing protected speech.280
B. EXCEPTIONS PUT FORWARD BY LOWER COURTS
Lower courts have worked hard to apply the exceptions to the Arcara rule
recognized by the Supreme Court, but judges on these courts also have done
something more: They have advocated the recognition of additional
exceptions to the Arcara rule. Two potential exceptions—one dealing with
lawful activities and the other dealing with unprotected speech—illustrate
how this process has unfolded.

781 n.15 (endorsing wrongful-purpose-based invalidations based in part on past Supreme Court
authority). The most recent treatment of purpose-based constitutional challenges is Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016).
274. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985).
275. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 608 (1987).
276. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993).
277. See generally Coenen, supra note 273, at 1755–73 (discussing a wide array of cases in
which the Court has invalidated legislation on the ground that it was enacted in furtherance of
unconstitutional purposes). Notably, the Court’s free-exercise ruling in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye may be especially significant in this regard. After all, as we have seen, the Court’s ruling
in the Smith case reflects a decision to apply the Free Speech Clause more aggressively than the
Free Exercise Clause as a general matter in cases involving generally applicable laws. See supra
notes 153–65 and accompanying text. It thus would seem anomalous for the Court to apply the
Free Speech Clause less aggressively than the Free Exercise Clause in assessing the
constitutionality of generally applicable laws based on claims of impermissible purpose.
278. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968).
279. Other considerations may support this same hesitance as well. See generally Coenen, supra
note 273, at 1758. Moreover, courts may find reasons to be more aggressive in responding to
wrongful-purpose challenges in some constitutional settings than others. See Stormans, Inc. v.
Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2437 n.3 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (noting
that different approaches might apply in the equal-protection and free-exercise contexts).
280. See note 268 and accompanying text (quoting State of Ohio ex. rel. Konstam); see also
Sanchez v. Warden, 570 A.2d 673, 677 (Conn. 1990) (upholding a rule that required
headphones to listen to radios in prison; but investigating, in so doing, whether prison authorities
had acted with the goal of limiting overall access to communications); Williams, supra note 2, at
724 (“[R]egulation derived from an actual intent to silence certain content categories is subject
to strict review . . . .”).
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1. The Lawful-Activity Exception
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Condemnation by Urban
Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh arose out of a local government’s eminentdomain-based acquisition of some 47 land parcels in a blighted in-town
neighborhood.281 On one parcel stood an adult bookstore, the owners of
which for this reason claimed that the taking of this property violated their
First Amendment rights.282 A majority of the court rejected this claim by
relying on the no-scrutiny rule of Arcara.283 It reasoned in effect that the
condemnation law imposed only a doubly incidental burden on speech
because it prohibited the continued operation of all businesses in the area,
much as the law in Arcara prohibited the continued operation of all businesses
that were sites of lewd activity.284 However, two dissenters—following the lead
of another dissenter in the lower Commonwealth Court—concluded that the
logic of Arcara dictated precisely the opposite result.285 In Arcara, after all, the
Court expressed concern that a litigant’s ability to insist on carve-outs from
otherwise generally applicable laws would provide a “cloak for obviously
unlawful public sexual conduct.”286 In addition, the Court in Arcara analogized
the lewd-bookstore operators who had their business shut down to
perpetrators of “Fire Code violations,” to someone who is “liable for a civil
damages award,” and to “a thief who is sent to prison [only to] complain that
his First Amendment right to speak in public places has been infringed.”287 In
striking contrast to these situations, according to the dissenters in the
Pennsylvania case, the speaker–landowners whose claims were before the
Court had not engaged in any “unlawful conduct” at all; rather, they were
operating an entirely legal business in what simply happened to be a blighted
neighborhood.288
To be sure, a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court saw no good
reason to apply the lawful-conduct/unlawful-conduct distinction put forward
by the dissenters in the case.289 Indeed, the majority might have gone so far as
to condemn the dissenters’ proposed unlawful-conduct exception as
internally incoherent. On this view, every generally applicable legal restraint
in its nature targets “unlawful activity” precisely because it renders unlawful
what was lawful before. For the dissenters, however, it made no sense to view
the activity of the unluckily located bookstore in the blighted-neighborhood281. In re Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, 913 A.2d 178, 180–81
(Pa. 2006).
282. Id. at 183.
283. Id. at 186–87.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 191 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
286. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986) (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 705–06.
288. In re Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Auth., 913 A.2d at 191 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 187–88 (majority opinion).
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condemnation case as wrongful, far less unlawful, in any meaningful sense.290
It remains to be seen whether lower courts—or the Supreme Court—will in
time write into law the theory of the dissenters in In re Condemnation by Urban
Redevelopment Authority. The case, however, highlights how lower court judges
might craft further limits on the Arcara rule.
2. The Unprotected-Speech Exception
Another proposed limitation on Arcara found a receptive lower-court
audience in People v. Sequoia Books.291 That case stemmed from the trial court’s
issuance of an injunction that barred a bookstore operator from continuing
to do business at its existing site for one year based on its past sale of several
obscene publications.292 Pushing aside the government’s reliance on Arcara,
the Illinois Supreme Court found that the injunction violated the First
Amendment.293 According to that court, Arcara was distinguishable because
the prostitution and lewd conduct that triggered governmental intervention
in that case “had ‘nothing to do with books or other expressive activity.’”294 In
contrast, the case at hand involved a penalty imposed for selling obscene
material, which constituted a form of expressive behavior.295 To be sure,
obscenity constituted “unprotected” speech under longstanding First
Amendment doctrine.296 Even so, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that
it would be intolerable to permit a state to close down any business for
engaging in only a few acts of unprotected speech—for example, by shutting
down an entire newspaper because a few libelous passages had found their
way at some point in the past into its compendious pages.297 By symmetry of
logic, according to the court, the state could not close down an entire
bookstore because a few obscene books had found their way onto its sprawling
shelves.
Sequoia Books held sway until the Supreme Court rejected the case’s
principle four years later in Alexander v. United States.298 That case involved an
even more severe penalty imposed on a bookstore that sold obscene
materials—namely, the permanent forfeiture of the operator’s place of
business, together with all of its inventory.299 In a five-to-four ruling, the Court
rejected the approach that had carried the day in Sequoia Books, determining
instead that Arcara mandated a rejection of the bookstore operator’s First
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 191 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 302, 309 (Ill. 1989).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 309 (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986)).
Id. at 309.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
Sequoia Books, 537 N.E.2d at 309.
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
Id. at 548.
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Amendment objection.300 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not dispute the proposition that obscene materials “may be ‘expressive’”
in some sense.301 For him the key point was that, as with the prostitution and
public lewdness involved in Arcara itself, obscenity could be “proscribed
consistent with the First Amendment” precisely because it was unprotected
speech.302
The Court’s ruling in Alexander, however, was not easily reached. In fact,
it generated a stinging dissent, joined by four members of the Court.
According to Justice Kennedy, it made a world of difference that the
challenged forfeiture in Alexander resulted from a “speech offense,”303 whereas
the wrongful conduct in Arcara had “nothing to do with books or other
expressive activity.”304 Justice Kennedy bemoaned a principle under which an
entire “bookstore or press enterprise could be forfeited as punishment for
even a single obscenity conviction,”305 thus producing—as in this very case—
the destruction “of hundreds of original titles and thousands of copies, all of
which are presumed to be protected speech.”306 In sum, “[i]n a society
committed to freedom of thought, inquiry, and discussion,”307 it was
“deplorable”308 to make “speakers and the press . . . vulnerable for all of their
expression based on some errant expression in the past.”309
The bottom line is that four members of the Court, led by Justice
Kennedy, deemed Arcara inapplicable in Alexander based on the distinction
between unprotected conduct and unprotected speech. This approach was
rejected by five Justices, but only one of them—Justice Thomas—remains on
the Court today. Meanwhile, the present-day Justices have moved aggressively
to protect free-expression rights in a wide variety of contexts,310 and Justice

300. Id. at 552–53.
301. Id. at 557 (citation omitted).
302. Id. (citation omitted).
303. Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
304. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986).
305. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 576. See also Schauer, Cuban Cigars, supra note 2, at 790 (noting “the special
character of books” in arguing that the Court might logically apply more exacting scrutiny to
government restrictions that impair their distribution because “the relationship between books
and the principles of freedom of speech and freedom of press need not be insulted by a citation”).
307. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 578.
309. Id. at 575.
310. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015) (applying strict scrutiny
in striking down a municipal law that sought to regulate signs related to meetings of nonprofit
groups, reasoning that the provisions were “content-based regulations of speech”); United States
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012) (invalidating a statute that prohibited the act of falsely
claiming receipt of military medals); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011) (holding that
the First Amendment barred a plaintiff from recovering damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against individuals affiliated with Westboro Baptist Church, who picketed the
funeral of the plaintiff’s son, a military veteran killed in Iraq); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
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Kennedy’s opinion in Alexander is marked by an unusually strident tone.311
Against this backdrop, would the current Court adhere to Alexander if the
chance to reconsider it arose next week? There is no way to know the answer
to that question, but the very fact that the answer is uncertain signals the
vulnerability of Arcara to additional qualifications.
C. EXCEPTIONS BASED ON DEVELOPING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The Court’s jurisprudence of generally applicable laws does not exist in
a vacuum. Rather, it is part of an ever-shifting landscape of free-speech law
and constitutional law more generally. Of particular significance, recent
constitutional developments raise the question whether further limits on the
Arcara no-review rule might emanate from an emerging jurisprudence of socalled “hybrid rights.”
As it turns out, the prospect of recognizing a hybrid-rights exception to
Arcara springs from the most famous of all the Court’s generally-applicablelaw rulings—namely, its landmark free-exercise ruling in the Smith
sacramental-peyote case. There, even as the Court barred the courthouse
door to the religiously motivated peyote user, it recognized that some
religious practitioners might remain able to invoke the Constitution to skirt
the reach of generally applicable laws. This qualification of the principle of
Smith emanated from the difficulty the Court encountered in reconciling that
decision with earlier rulings—including Murdock v. Pennsylvania312—in which
it had exempted religious practitioners from generally applicable laws on
what seemed to be free-exercise grounds. In distinguishing those cases, Justice
Scalia reasoned that they had not involved “the Free Exercise Clause alone.”313
Murdock, for example, concerned “a flat license tax, the payment of which
[was] a condition of the exercise of . . . constitutional privileges” asserted by
the publisher of a religious magazine.314 That case, he explained, thus
presented a hybrid situation in which the right of free exercise operated “in
conjunction with . . . freedom of speech” in such a way that the publisher
could sidestep the operation of the generally applicable tax law.315
Smith and Murdock signal that courts sometimes will direct elevated
scrutiny at generally applicable laws so long as a free-speech claim operates
“in conjunction with” a free-exercise claim—and perhaps in conjunction with

460, 482 (2010) (holding that a federal statute that outlawed depictions of animal cruelty
violated the First Amendment). See generally Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law,
97 B.U. L. REV. 1533 (2017).
311. See, e.g., Alexander, 509 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (condemning the majority’s
approach as “deplorable” in its “abandonment of fundamental First Amendment principles” and
as embodying a “flagrant violation of the right of free speech”).
312. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
313. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
314. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112.
315. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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constitutional claims of other kinds. This principle might best explain the
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Hodgkins ex rel. v. Peterson,316 although the court did
not expressly make use of a hybrid-rights rationale. There the court
invalidated a juvenile curfew law on First Amendment grounds, finding that
the O’Brien standard—rather than the Arcara no-review rule—applied because
curfew violations are “intimately related” to later-occurring speech activity.317
Also in the picture, however, were hybrid-rights concerns because the
challenged law simultaneously raised issues about the due-process-based
liberty of free movement and the right of parents to control the activities of
their children.318 Notably, in Smith, the Court indicated that free-exercise
claims could operate in tandem not only with free-expression claims, but also
with substantive fundamental-rights claims rooted in the Due Process
Clauses.319 And if due-process-based claims can thus operate “in conjunction
with” free-exercise rights, why not with free-speech rights as well?
To be sure, the subject of hybrid rights remains deeply undertheorized
by the Supreme Court and (perhaps for that reason) subject to criticism from
many quarters.320 Even so, recent scholarship suggests that hybrid-rights
review has taken hold across many areas of constitutional law.321 Of particular
importance here, the Court in Smith signaled its openness to using this mode
of analysis for the specific purpose of evading a no-review constitutional rule
otherwise applicable to generally applicable laws.322 This aspect of that case
may thus point the way to judicial recognition of a hybrid-rights-based
exception to the kindred no-review rule set forth in Arcara.323

316. Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2004).
317. Id. at 1058–59.
318. Id. at 1051 (noting that the parents raised due process arguments as well). For cases
applying intermediate scrutiny to children’s curfew laws that parents challenged on the ground
that such laws violate the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause,
see Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 173, 176 (2d Cir. 2003), and Hutchins v. District
of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 535, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
319. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82 (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), among
other cases).
320. See, e.g., Shaman, supra note 2, at 443–44 (“Commentators have been routinely
disdainful of the hybrid-rights exception, viewing it as a bungled attempt to distinguish
disagreeable precedent, and the Sixth Circuit refused to follow it on the ground that it was
‘completely illogical.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State
Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993))).
321. See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1077–86
(2016) (analyzing cases in which the Court has applied different hybrid-rights doctrines); David
L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 772–78 (1994)
(discussing the aggregation of rights in constitutional analysis); Stephen Kanter, The Griswold
Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 638–40 (2006)
(discussing cases in which the Court has employed hybrid-rights analysis).
322. See supra notes 148–62 and accompanying text.
323. Consider, for example, a variation of the facts of Arcara that involve the closing not of an
adult bookstore, but of a church (in which the since-fired pastor had engaged in prostitution). In
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D. EXCEPTIONS ADVANCED BY ACADEMIC COMMENTATORS
What other exceptions to the no-scrutiny rule of Arcara lurk in the legal
materials? Two potential limits have been put forward in scholarly
commentary—one focused on countering the risk of purposeful government
speech suppression and the other focused on dealing with generally
applicable laws that have particularly far-reaching, speech-inhibiting effects.
1. The Bad-Purpose-Prophylaxis Exception
Srikanth Srinivasan—now a distinguished federal circuit court judge but
then still a recent law school graduate—grappled with O’Brien and Arcara in a
penetrating paper published in 1995. In that article, Judge Srinivasan
endorsed an approach that called for heightened judicial evaluation of
generally applicable laws—including in cases otherwise controlled by Arcara—
“if there exist special reasons to suspect a speech-restrictive motive” lay behind
the government’s action.324 This proposed exception to Arcara differs from
the improper-purpose exception325 in an important respect: In the view of
Srinivasan, it is the “danger” of the operation of an improper purpose that
properly triggers heightened judicial review;326 thus the challenger need not
go so far as to prove an actual improper purpose to escape the operation of
Arcara.327
The Court has never expressly embraced this approach. According to
Srinivasan, however, his view of things provides the best explanation of the
Court’s application of intermediate scrutiny in Albertini, rather than Arcara’s
no-scrutiny rule, while also accounting for other key rulings, including Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co.328 There is much reason to question Judge Srinivasan’s

part because of the combination of communicative and religious activities that occur within church
communities, the tug of hybrid-rights analysis might well prove hard to resist in such a setting.
324. Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 420.
325. See supra notes 265–80 and accompanying text.
326. Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 417.
327. Id. at 416 n.77 (contrasting the proposed test, which focuses on “the danger of a speechsuppressive administrative motive,” from a test founded on proof of an “outright . . . intent to
restrict speech”).
328. Id. at 417–19. Albertini, in Srinivasan’s view, presented a “danger that the military applied
the reentry law against Albertini in order to suppress his [anti-nuclear-arms] speech, or at least
that the decision to apply the law was a reaction to his demonstration.” Id. at 417. More
specifically, the presence of that danger rendered Albertini distinguishable from the hypothetical
case, posited by Justice O’Connor in Arcara, involving application of a speeding law to the laterunning reporter. Thus, “if Albertini had been cited for speeding while traveling to the military
base, it would have been extremely unlikely that a desire to restrict his expressive activities
provoked his arrest.” Id. at 416. Indeed, “[e]xcept under peculiar circumstances, his plans to go
to the base and his intent to engage in a protest there would have been unknown to the arresting
agent.” Id. In the actual Albertini case, however, there were “special reasons,” id. at 420, that
pointed to a “danger of improper administrative motivation.” Id. at 418. Accordingly, while it
would “normally be the case” that the no-scrutiny rule of Arcara should operate when “a distinct,
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proposed synthesis.329 If he is right, however, yet another exception to the
Arcara rule may be waiting in the wings. Indeed, Srinivasan’s analysis suggests
that the Court has been assessing—albeit without saying so—whether “special
reasons” suggest the presence of bad motives in deciding whether to invoke
the rule of O’Brien or Arcara in close cases.330 And if that is true, the Court
already is applying, as a practical matter, yet another limit on Arcara’s noreview rule.331
2. The Substantial-Effects Exception
Another mechanism for tempering the no-review rule of Arcara finds
expression in the work of Professor Michael Dorf.332 In a major treatment of
all forms of generally applicable rules, Dorf advocated a principle under
which heightened scrutiny would attach to all “laws having the incidental
effect of substantially burdening fundamental rights to engage in primary
conduct,” including primary conduct in the form of speech.333 While Dorf has
claimed that this approach is “implicit” in the Court’s cases,334 there is reason
to question this assertion, especially in light of the real-world speech burdens
tolerated by the Court in Arcara, and even more so in Alexander.335

nonexpressive violation . . . triggers application of a law,” in some cases—such as Albertini—it
would be proper for courts to apply a heightened style of means-ends scrutiny. Id. at 418–19.
329. See, e.g., Bogen, supra note 2, at 231 (asserting that Srinivasan’s reading of Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co. “was not stated as a standard for decision” in that case, and that application of this
standard defies “easy judgment”).
330. Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 420.
331. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 499 (“[T]he Court’s decision to apply intermediate review to
certain incidental restrictions may result not so much from use of the Arcara test as from a visceral
sense that an illicit factor entered into a governmental decision—whether legislative,
administrative, or judicial.”).
332. Dorf, supra note 2, at 1179.
333. Id. (emphasis added). Professor Dorf does not address with crystalline clarity how his
“substantially burdening” approach to “incidental effect” problems intersects with Arcara and the
doubly-incidental-burden category of cases it exemplifies. His own articulation of the
“substantially burdening” test, however, suggests that it applies to all forms of incidental-effect
cases, and he states that in Arcara “the Court subjected an incidental burden on speech to no First
Amendment scrutiny at all.” Id. at 1205 (emphasis added). For this reason, it appears that Dorf
would apply his “substantially burdening” limiting principle not only in O’Brien-type incidental
burden cases, but also to doubly-incidental-burden cases like Arcara. See Campbell, supra note 2,
at 4 (indicating that Dorf’s approach applies to “incidental burdens on speech, whether falling
on expressive or nonexpressive conduct”). For the suggestion of an approach akin to Professor
Dorf’s, see Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at 112–13 (pointing to a difference
between incidental-burden cases that involve a “significant effect” and a “modest effect” on
speech rights, and placing O’Brien in the latter category).
334. Dorf, supra note 2, at 1240.
335. See supra Part V.B.2. For additional critiques of Dorf’s approach, see Bogen, supra note
2, at 249 (challenging the “substantial burden” test on the ground that “it is arbitrary” and in
effect applies “balancing . . . to all laws impacting speech”); Campbell, supra note 2, at 9, 58–62
(expressing concerns that this approach might well prove “unmanageable and underprotective
of speech interests”); and Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 414–15 (challenging the “‘substantial’
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At the same time, it may be that the nature of the burden imposed on
First Amendment freedoms has played a role, and will continue to play a role,
in the resolution of borderline Arcara-related cases. Notably, the Court has
specifically employed substantial-burden rhetoric in some past free-speech
cases,336 and the significance of the burden imposed by the statute at issue in
Alexander weighed heavily on the minds of the four dissenters.337 Indeed,
Arcara itself offers support for assessing the burden on speech imposed by the
challenged law because Chief Justice Burger paused in that case to minimize
the impact of the store-closing order. As he put the point: “The severity of this
burden is dubious . . . [because] respondents remain free to sell the same
materials at another location.”338
The broader point is that Arcara both reflects and has given rise to
cross currents in the law. On the one hand, the Court has sought to respond
to opening-of-the-floodgates concerns founded on the reality that all forms of
generally applicable laws—from tax laws to labor laws to speeding laws—can
and do have ripple effects that impede the exercise of free-speech rights.339
On the other hand, both Supreme Court Justices and lower court judges have
balked at the idea that they can never consider the speech-suppressive impacts
of generally applicable laws, including in doubly-incidental-burden cases,
precisely because those impacts can be so severe.340 In sum, the emergence of
speech-restrictive effect” approach, in part on the ground that it would produce uncertainties in
“countless cases”).
336. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (applying strict scrutiny
on an expressive-association theory based on the conclusion that “a state requirement that the
Boy Scouts retain Dale . . . would significantly burden the organization’s right to oppose or
disfavor homosexual conduct”). See also Stone, Free Speech, supra note 2, at 298 (explaining
NAACP v. Alabama and Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee as cases involving the
invalidation of “laws of otherwise general application” because their effects on speech were
“particularly severe”); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at 63–64 (suggesting that
the theme of the Court’s earlier decisions in Button, Brown, and Jaycees involved the presence or
absence of a “significant” or “serious” burden on free speech rights); Williams, supra note 2, at
713 n.360 (noting the Court’s decisions in Brown and Bates and attributing its invalidation of
generally applicable laws in those cases to “the exceptionally severe impact of disclosure
requirements on unpopular groups”).
337. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 576 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that, while “the sanction in Arcara did not involve a complete confiscation or destruction
of protected expression,” the state’s action here resulted in the forfeiture “of hundreds of original
titles and thousands of copies”).
338. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986).
339. Dorf, supra note 2, at 1198–99 (“[O]ne must . . . confront the practical problem of how
to recognize incidental burdens without invalidating all legislation—that is, the floodgates
concern.”); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at 107 (noting the “Pandora’s box”
and the “nightmare of judicial administration” arguments against judicial scrutiny of generally
applicable laws).
340. See supra notes 226–32 and accompanying text (detailing actual and potential
exceptions identified by courts to the Arcara rule). See also Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra
note 2, at 107 (defending the Court’s openness to reviewing generally applicable laws on freespeech grounds because “some laws that have only an incidental effect on free expression may
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multiple exceptions to the Arcara no-review rule suggests that neither the
floodgates concern nor the severe-effects concern has carried the day in an
all-out fashion.341 Against this backdrop, it should come as no surprise if
courts, going forward, more openly take account of the speech-impairing
consequences of challenged statutes in deciding whether to apply the Arcara
rule.342
VI.

THE FUTURE OF THE COURT’S GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW DOCTRINE

What is there to be said about First Amendment limits on generally
applicable laws? The foregoing discussion lays the groundwork for six
overarching observations.
First and foremost, there is a pressing need in this doctrinal field to
exercise care in using legal labels. Courts—including the Supreme Court—
tend to deploy terms such as “generally applicable” and “incidental burdens”
far too loosely, thus generating confusion in the law. Key steps in addressing
this problem involve (1) endorsing the basic tripartite structure presented
here and (2) clarifying the nature of the rules (and the nature of the
exceptions to those rules) that operate with regard to each key legal category.
The Supreme Court must take the lead in this effort. For thoughtful lawyers,
however, the inevitably ongoing nature of this process will open up
opportunities. This Article shows, for example, that all is not lost simply
because a case that involves a generally applicable rule does not trigger strict
have a substantial restrictive effect”). Also supporting the pull toward greater flexibility is that
idea that the “balancing inquiry need not be an involved one in every case.” Srinivasan, supra note
2, at 406 (challenging “First Amendment overload” argument on this ground). For another
proposed limit on the operation of Arcara proposed by a First Amendment scholar, see generally
Campbell, supra note 2 (advocating an exception focused on “speech-facilitating conduct”).
341. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 1199 (“[C]urrent Supreme Court doctrine attempts to
reconcile these theoretical and practical considerations by treating incidental burdens as
infringements on constitutional rights in some, but not all, circumstances.”).
342. Pre-Arcara rulings also suggest the tendency of courts to consider the degree and
proportionality of the burden imposed on speech in assessing the constitutionality of generally
applicable laws. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Croatan Books, Inc., 323 S.E.2d 86, 87 (Va. 1984)
(noting the suitability of the store-closure remedy in light of the “continuous and pervasive
nature” of the illegal conduct); Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Allouwill Realty Corp., 478 A.2d
1334, 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (upholding closure order in part because it allowed for
remedial adjustment based on a demonstration “that the premises are going to be used for proper
activities”); People ex rel. Sorenson v. Randolph, 160 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
(noting that the burden placed on the abated business was rightly proportionate in light of “a
history of police problems and . . . prior warnings [that] had gone unheeded”). See generally Victor
V. Vicinaiz, The Content Distinction and Freedom of Expression: Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 20
CREIGHTON L. REV. 893, 904–07 (1986) (discussing these and other cases). In addition, courts
might well take account of the context-specific substantiality of burdens on speech in applying
state constitutional protections of free expression—particularly since this is exactly what
happened in Arcara itself. See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495 (N.Y.
1986) (finding a violation of the state constitution following remand; distinguishing the speeding
reporter case on the ground that the burden on free speech presented there was “slight and
indirect” compared to the burden created by “closing a bookstore for a year”).
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scrutiny under the principle of Humanitarian Law Project, or even intermediate
scrutiny under the principle of O’Brien. Why not? Because it turns out that the
Arcara no-scrutiny rule is laced with exceptions that have both a broad scope
and a malleable quality.
Understanding the three-part typology outlined here also brings into
view the possibility of producing new and surprising results. As we have seen,
for example, hybrid-rights analysis may operate in some cases to hold back the
operation of the Arcara no-scrutiny doctrine.343 Indeed, a strong judicial
embrace of hybrid-rights thinking could even change the results in earlierdecided cases, beginning with Alexander.344 Also in the picture is the question
whether some generally applicable laws should fall entirely outside the
tripartite doctrinal structure developed here. In another Article, for example,
I explain how generally applicable rules of evidence that operate to burden
speech may differ in a constitutionally significant way from generally
applicable rules of conduct.345 I also have noted that evidence rules bear a
kinship to generally applicable laws regarding remedies—all of which might
even suggest that the Arcara case itself was wrongly decided, at least if the
bookstore closing in that case is viewed as remedial in nature.346 To be sure,
there are many complications here. But the overarching point is that such
arguments become available only as analysts sharpen their ability to see the
nuances that mark the Court’s emerging doctrinal treatment of generally
applicable laws.
Second, it bears emphasis that the three-part methodology put forward
here provides only a starting point—albeit an important starting point—for
First Amendment analysis. Even with that methodology in clear view, courts
will have to work hard to sort through a welter of analytical problems.347 Of
343. See supra notes 312–23 and accompanying text.
344. Notably, in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court gave protection to
supposedly unprotected obscene speech when viewed within the home. See id. at 559. Building
on Stanley, courts might view obscenity as meriting a measure of Free Speech Clause protection,
at least when (as in Alexander) its suppression carries with it a far-reaching forfeiture of wholly
protected speech materials (and especially so when that taking of property is wholly
uncompensated).
345. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Free Speech and the Law of Evidence (Jan. 6, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). Notably, thoughtful commentators have investigated how
constitutional free-speech law and generally applicable rules of evidence should intersect in cases that
involve politically controversial speech, but they have done so without considering the possible
relevance of the principles laid down in O’Brien and Arcara. See generally Robert P. Faulkner, Evidence of
First Amendment Activity at Trial: The Articulation of A Higher Evidentiary Standard, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1994); Peter E. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence: The Problem of
United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622 (1977).
346. See Coenen, supra note 345.
347. By way of example, Professor Cole has argued that the Court in Humanitarian Law Project
departed from the analytical approach normally directed at content-discriminatory laws by
applying “deferential strict scrutiny.” Cole, supra note 132, at 158 (citation omitted). It remains
to be seen whether any such tweaking of operative doctrine will take hold, either as a formal
matter or as a practical matter, in future cases.
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particular importance, the organizing cases of Humanitarian Law Project,
O’Brien, and Arcara all involved what we might call “standard” free-speech
issues—that is, issues that arose out of government restrictions on the ability
of persons to communicate ideas or information to others. Large questions
remain about how the three-part synthesis will map onto other types of freeexpression cases, including (for example) cases that involve specialized
doctrines with regard to information gathering, expressive association, and
access to public forums.348 These complexities highlight a key point: The
doctrinal structure put forward here—like any doctrinal structure—is
inherently incomplete and inevitably destined to take on shape only as courts
process future fact-specific cases. At the same time, the preceding analysis
reveals the existence of an overarching scheme that is already in place and
that courts must keep in view as they grapple with free-expression disputes. In
particular, this scheme should provide the starting point for thinking about
how the Free Speech Clause operates in all cases involving generally
applicable laws, including those cases that do not involve “standard” forms of
expression control.
Third, the most vexing questions that arise in this field center on
problems of characterization. As a result, courts must take care not to gloss
over subtle challenges raised by characterization choices. As we have seen, for
example, Albertini presented a knotty question that the Court never even
paused to notice: Was the ban on entering a military base at issue in that case
so “intimately related” to the defendant’s subsequent on-base speech activity
that it properly triggered intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien?349 Put another
way, the case required a decision as to whether the defendant’s entry onto the
base was rightly viewed in isolation or as a part of a broader pattern of activity.
As it turns out, these sorts of linkage-based characterization problems pervade
constitutional law, and in dealing with the First Amendment—just as in any
other context—courts would do well not to act as if they did not exist.350 More
generally, as we have seen along the way, the resolution of hard
characterization questions often will hinge on considerations of underlying
constitutional policy—concerns that in this context involve matters such as

348. The Court’s ruling in Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist. illustrates the complexities raised by
public-forum cases. In that case, the Court rejected a Speech Clause challenge to a law that
required a permit for holding any “large-scale events” in a municipal park, whether the event
involved a sit-in, a company picnic, or a crowd-producing rugby match. Thomas v. Chicago Park
Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 318–22 (2002). The opinion is a curious one, in part because it was authored
by Justice Scalia, who generally viewed generally applicable laws as properly subject to no special
constitutional limits of any kind, even when particular applications of them “hit” speech activities.
349. See supra Part IV.A.
350. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311,
1313, 1318 (2002) (noting the inevitable need for courts to “slice [a] ceaseless and complex
course of dealings into adjudicative transactions for the purpose of evaluating whether
government has inflicted a constitutionally cognizable harm” and that “the problem of
transactional framing is pervasive in constitutional law”).
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the risk of improper motivation, the harms created by chilling effects, and the
presence of particularly severe or unjustified burdens on speech.351 Because
these considerations are sure to carry weight as judges grapple with close-call
characterization choices, lawyers would do well to bring them to the surface.
No less important, courts that rely on these considerations should openly and
frankly explain why they are doing so, thus encouraging other courts to join
the effort to avoid the sort of obfuscation that too often has marked this area
of law.
Fourth, meta-policies that pervade constitutional decision-making lie at
the root of the Court’s treatment of free-speech issues in cases concerning
generally applicable laws. Of particular importance is the ubiquitous struggle
between rules and standards.352 Most notably, Arcara is a rule-favoring
decision, launched largely to advance the cause of legal certainty across a
broad swath of real-world conflicts. As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously
observed, however, “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”353 And post-Arcara developments illustrate how doctrines crafted
to exempt generally applicable laws from life-complicating judicial scrutiny
may turn out to have a fool’s-gold quality. Complexities arise in part because
there are many different ways in which courts can and do sidestep the
operation of these doctrines. They might, as in Eichman, characterize what
looks like a generally applicable law as not generally applicable upon close
inspection.354 They might, as in Humanitarian Law Project, determine that a
case involves a special kind of generally applicable law, thereby bringing into
play strict judicial review.355 They might, as in O’Brien, deal with some types of
generally applicable laws by ratcheting the level of judicial scrutiny downward,
while nonetheless refusing to abandon judicial scrutiny altogether.356 Or they
might—in the pattern that marked even the Court’s free-exercise ruling in
Smith—recognize exceptions to a constitutional principle that otherwise
forecloses judicial review altogether.357
As we have seen, this last approach has generated a complex mix of
actual and potential exceptions to the no-review standard of Arcara.358 It would
not be accurate to say that these exceptions now reach so far that they have
swallowed the Arcara rule. They do, however, bring to this field a measure of
complexity that undermines any claim that the Court’s standoffish approach
to doubly-incidental-burden cases has sown only certainty in its wake. In the

351. See supra Part V.D.1–2 (discussing analyses of Srinivasan and Dorf).
352. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22 (1992).
353. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
354. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 127–39 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 23–24, 145–48 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 316, 318–19 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 218–342 and accompanying text.
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end, the inevitable challenges of drawing a line between O’Brien-type and
Arcara-type cases,359 the odd results that drawing that line can create,360 the
emergence of a checkerboard of exceptions to the no-review principle that
usually controls the latter set of cases,361 the plasticity that marks those
exceptions,362 and the possibility that additional exceptions will take hold in
the future363 conspire to invite the conclusion that the hoped-for benefits of
Arcara’s supposedly bright-line rule have not been realized in practice. In
these circumstances, it is fair to ask whether that rule should endure.364 It is
fairer still to question the wisdom of expanding judicial use of Arcara’s hardedged methodology, particularly by way of abandoning the Court’s
intermediate-scrutiny approach to O’Brien-type incidental-burden cases.365 To
be sure, there is room in the law for establishing and adhering to certaintyfostering doctrines. The play-out of Arcara illustrates, however, the difficulty
of maintaining the integrity of doctrines designed to immunize generally
applicable laws from any form of constitutional attack when those laws clash
in powerful ways with core constitutional values.366
Fifth, the free-speech doctrines that have taken hold in this area—and
particularly the no-review rule of Arcara—may prove to be vulnerable to
change in light of the shifting membership of the Supreme Court. The
departure in the post-Arcara period of three Justices from the Court seems
especially significant. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined Arcara and penned
359. See, e.g., supra notes 251–64 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s ruling in
Albertini).
360. See, e.g., Shaman, supra note 2, at 433 (noting Arcara’s effort to distinguish O’Brien but also
concluding that this distinction was “misguided”); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at
112 (questioning whether Arcara is fairly distinguishable from earlier incidental-burden cases).
361. See supra notes 215–311 and accompanying text.
362. See id.
363. See supra notes 312–42 and accompanying text (discussing possible substantial-burden
and wrongful-purpose-prophylaxis exceptions); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at
110 (raising the question whether limits noted in Arcara “exhaust the circumstances in which the
Court will review a law that has only an incidental effect”); Williams, supra note 2, at 726–27
(proposing an exception to Arcara’s no-review rule under which states’ speech-related response
to a generally-applicable-law violation must be “related” to that violation); see also Neutral Rules of
General Applicability, supra note 2, at 1735 (reasoning that developments in other related
constitutional fields may push forward efforts “for examining the most extreme burdens on First
Amendment rights” in generally-applicable-law cases).
364. See generally Schauer, Categories, supra note 2, at 307 (“The risk of misapplication of
numerous subcategories leads us to eschew subcategories within the first amendment. . . .”).
365. See supra notes 149–64 and accompanying text. Of interest in this regard is the Court’s
recent recognition of an additional exception to the free-exercise rule of Smith, the Court’s seminal
effort to apply a bright-line-type no-review rule to generally applicable laws. See Hosanna–Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 702–07 (2012) (precluding suits
by ministers against churches based on generally applicable employment-discrimination laws).
366. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at 58 (noting the draw toward
reviewing content-neutral laws when those laws have a “severe effect” on speech). See generally
Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES
803 (2005) (discussing the breakdown of bright-line rules).
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the majority opinion in Alexander, earned a reputation over many years as a
largely “statist” thinker, including with respect to free-speech issues.367 Justice
Scalia was the architect of Smith, a staunch patron of Arcara, and the great
champion within the Court of embracing a rules-over-standards
jurisprudence.368 Finally, Justice Stevens, though often viewed as a First
Amendment “liberal,” led the charge for establishing the no-exemption
approach of Smith369 and endorsed the bright-line rule applied in both Arcara
and Alexander.370 In contrast, none of the Court’s four now-sitting “liberals”
have signed on to Justice Stevens’s hands-off approach to cases that involve
generally applicable laws. And Justice Kennedy—as we have seen—
passionately opposed application of the Arcara rule in Alexander.371 Perhaps
most important of all, members of the so-called “conservative” wing of the
current Court have signaled concerns about endorsing a no-review approach
to generally applicable laws. Indeed, there are signals in the case law that this
branch of the Court may look with special concern, rather than unflinching
reserve, at generally applicable anti-discrimination laws insofar as they burden
particularly important expressive-association rights.372 What all of this means
for the future is unclear. One thing, however, is clear enough: A reading of
the tea leaves gives reason to suspect that the now-sitting Justices may hesitate

367. Elliot Mincberg, A Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Judicial Prior Restraint and the
First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 872 (1993) (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist
“exemplified” a “‘statist’ view” of the judicial role); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom
of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 152 (2010) (suggesting that Chief Justice Rehnquist gravitated
toward “a consistent statist position” at least in free-speech cases).
368. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[W]e should avoid wherever possible . . . analysis that requires judicial assessment of the
‘importance’ of government interests . . . .”); see also David Boling, Comment, The Jurisprudential
Approach of Justice Antonin Scalia: Methodology over Result?, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1143, 1197 (1991)
(noting Justice Scalia’s “aversion to applying ‘balancing modes’ and ‘totality of the circumstances’
tests”). See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187
(1989) (arguing that standards should “be avoided where possible [and rules should] be
extended as far as the nature of the question allows”).
369. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (relying on Justice Stevens’s earlier
concurring opinion in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
370. See supra notes 200–09, 279–90 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 303–11 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (invalidating application
of an antidiscrimination law to require organization’s use of a gay scoutmaster based on freedom
of expressive association). See also Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2433–35 (2016)
(Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing
that the Court should consider whether a state regulation requiring pharmacies to provide
emergency contraceptives violates the Free Exercise Clause); cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing
concern that the majority’s decision might prevent persons sincerely opposed to same-sex
marriage from exercising religious freedoms). For a detailed development of the Boy Scouts case—
including a critique based on the notion that the Court failed to take proper account of its
generally applicable character—see Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 810–17.
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to keep traveling down the same path marked by their predecessors for
dealing with generally applicable laws.
The final question looms: What is there to say about the three-part
scheme laid out here in light of overarching First Amendment theory?
Drawing on different conceptions of that Amendment’s purpose,
distinguished commentators—one of whom now sits on the Supreme
Court373—have reflected fruitfully on the proper treatment of generally
applicable laws.374 Much of this work reflects a difference in philosophical
outlook. Some analysts see the Free Speech Clause as centered on rooting out
restrictions that stem from, or facilitate actions based on, speech-suppressive
motivations. In their view, the chief aim of the clause is to facilitate judicial
watchdogging of self-interested and majority-minded political officials,375 thus
properly steering doctrine in the direction of ensuring that those officials do
not purposefully act to rein in offbeat and state-critical expression.376 Other
analysts focus less on speech-suppressive motivations and more on real-world
effects. They urge that such First Amendment goals as facilitating the wideopen search for truth and accommodating valued exercises of personal selfexpression require a practical focus on speech-suppressive impacts, regardless
of the state-actor motivations that brought those impacts about.377
Some commentators who favor a purpose-centered approach have
faulted the Court’s treatment of generally applicable laws, particularly under
the O’Brien test, which triggers a measure of free-speech review even in the
seeming absence of wrongful motivations.378 This Article may provide at least
a partial response to this line of criticism by highlighting that O’Brien does not
stand alone. Instead, (1) it operates to trigger only a limited form of scrutiny

373. See Kagan, supra note 2.
374. See supra note 2 (collecting key scholarly treatments).
375. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 528, 538–44, 631–48 (arguing that the First Amendment serves as a democracyfostering check on the government by the governed).
376. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 2, at 414, 443 (“First Amendment law, as developed by the
Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the
discovery of improper governmental motives” and “rules . . . devised to flush out illicit purpose
. . . constitute the foundation stones of First Amendment doctrine”); id. at 423, 427–37, 505–17;
Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 775 (focusing on the importance of wrongful motivation, including
by noting that “an impermissible legislative purpose undoubtedly can render an otherwise valid
law unconstitutional”); see also id. at 767–70, 775–78; Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 415–16 (arguing
that “the danger of a speech-suppressive administrative motive rather than the degree of speechrestrictive effect” properly explains “the Supreme Court’s entire approach to incidental
restrictions of speech”).
377. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 1176, 1232–33, 1242–43 (suggesting that judicial review
of laws that incidentally burden speech should focus on speech-burdening effects); Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at 57–80 (endorsing judicial review of content-neutral
laws even when not motivated by an improper purposes).
378. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 786 (“The O’Brien test runs into trouble . . . because
it presents itself as . . . unmoored from an inquiry into legislative purpose.”).
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even when a law’s as-applied, speech-inhibiting impact is profound,379 and
(2) it constitutes only one part of a broader three-part framework, which
includes a treatment of doubly incidental burdens that precludes Free Speech
Clause review in a broad array of cases that involve generally applicable laws.380
Of no less importance, even analysts who take a purpose-centered view of
things recognize that O’Brien-based intermediate scrutiny may help to “smoke
out” wrongful, but hidden, legislative motives.381 Of importance, too, is the
fact that there is no inconsistency in paying attention to problematic purposes
and paying attention to problematic effects at the same time in assessing freespeech problems. As it turns out, the Court—neither surprisingly nor
unwisely—has taken account of both the purpose-centered and effectcentered theories in crafting its own overarching vision of how the First
Amendment should work.382
***
Against this backdrop, two questions move to center stage: Does it make
sense for courts to scrutinize laws that impose direct-in-effect burdens on
speech more aggressively than laws that impose incidental burdens on
speech? And does it also make sense for courts to look at laws that impose
incidental burdens on speech more carefully than laws that impose doubly
incidental burdens?
The answer to the first question is clearly “yes” for two main reasons. First,
incidental burdens on speech by definition have nothing to do with regulating
speech because of its content or speech-related impact. The law at issue in
O’Brien, for example, operated against draft-card destroyers without one iota
of regard to how audience members were being influenced or affected by the
card-burner’s expression. In contrast, concerns about speech-related effects
lie at the heart of challenges to generally applicable laws that impose directin-effect burdens on speech for the most straightforward of reasons: When
generally applicable laws impose direct-in-effect speech burdens, they do so
precisely because listener reactions to the particular expressions at issue have
379. See supra notes 184–91 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text.
381. See Davis & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 182; see also Kagan, supra note 2, at 457–59
(noting the importance of impact-related prophylactic rules to guard against the exercise of
wrongful lawmaker purpose); Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 420 (describing O’Brien as “fairly
coherent and sensible” notwithstanding its lack of an overt focus on wrongful purpose).
382. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 2, at 415 (“Some aspects of First Amendment law resist
explanation in terms of motive . . . .”); id. at 455 (noting relevance, including in assessing contentneutral laws, of an effects-driven “speaker-based perspective”). See generally Volokh, Speech as
Conduct, supra note 2, at 1339 n.317 (“The Supreme Court has been notoriously reluctant . . . to
settle on any theory—self-government, the search for truth, self-expression, and so on—as being
the sole foundation of First Amendment law.”). For one example of effect-centered reasoning,
see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (“In the domain of these
indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of this Court
recognize that abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from
varied forms of governmental action.”).
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triggered the law’s operation. For this reason, concerns centered on
regulating speech based on content and speech-specific effects—which
constitute core drivers of First Amendment law383—operate in the two
contexts in dramatically different ways.384
Second, laws that impose incidental burdens on speech in their very
nature foreclose only one particular mode of communicating a message,
whereas laws that place direct-in-effect burden on speech can and often do
foreclose communication of a disfavored message altogether. In O’Brien, for
example, the protester remained free to express his message in many ways,
including not only by speaking or writing but also (for example) by burning
an identical facsimile of his draft card. In telling contrast, when the
government enacts an across-the-board prohibition on obstructing the draft,
vigorous anti-draft communications become subject to government control in
all their forms.385 Put simply, such a restriction renders unlawful otherwise
protected speech against the draft, whatever form it takes, no less than it
renders unlawful (for example) all forms of obstructing entrance to a draftboard office. The core distinction in First Amendment law between
forbidding dissemination of certain messages, as opposed to forbidding only
certain means of disseminating those messages, thus strongly reinforces the
Court’s choice to apply the strictest form of review in direct-in-effect-burden
cases, while ratcheting downward the level of review in incidental-burden
cases such as O’Brien.386
383. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
384. See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1301. Given these considerations, speecheffect-minded thinkers should have little difficulty applying strict scrutiny to generally applicable
laws that place direct-in-effect burdens on expression. After all, the practical impact of such laws
is exactly the same as that of laws that directly regulate speech—that is, the speaker is silenced
because (and only because) of speech-based effects on listeners. To be sure, Professor Volokh has
observed that applying strict scrutiny to direct-in-effect-burden-imposing generally applicable
laws might seem “in some tension” with purpose-centered theories. Id.; see, e.g., Kagan, supra note
2, at 461–62 (noting that generally applicable breach-of-the-peace statutes “preselect[ ] no
particular ideas as posing a danger” and that the application of such statutes “not only to speech,
but also to conduct posing a risk of disorder,” carries with it a “breadth [that] usually decreases
. . . the chance[s] of illicit purpose”). Perhaps, however, this perceived tension is overstated. Why?
Partly because untangling bad purposes is a complex matter. For example, the legislature’s failure
to build a speech-related exemption into a generally applicable breach-of-the-peace law may
result, to some degree, from impatience with maverick speakers. Such inaction might also flow
from systemic institutional failures to rightly weigh the rights of such persons and the value of
their exercise of rights, including to the broader society. See Werhan, supra note 2, at 657 (noting
that government officials “can be expected to overregulate expression”). In light of all this, a
thoughtful, purpose-minded free-speech theorist might at least think twice before rejecting a
principle of careful judicial review for laws that impose direct-in-effect burdens on speech—which
is exactly how the Court has dealt with cases such as Cohen v. California.
385. See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 2, at 1287–91, 1301 (developing this point in
detail, including with regard to the Court’s now-discredited treatment of the early Schenck and
Debs cases).
386. See, e.g., Bogen, supra note 2, at 248 (endorsing O’Brien’s “[p]rophylactic standards” in
part because they do not call on “the Court to use its most stringent test to review the incidental
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So, what of the Court’s drawing of a distinction between those laws that
impose incidental burdens on speech as opposed to those laws that impose
doubly incidental burdens? The argument in favor of this distinction begins
with a simple idea: At least as a rule, to the extent that a proposed generally
applicable restriction will “hit” speech itself, a greater likelihood should exist
that the speech-inhibiting effect of the restriction will be visible to lawmakers
and thus, at least potentially, play a problematic role in driving the
restriction’s enactment. O’Brien is the poster-child for this line of thinking.
There, after all, federal legislators well knew when they enacted the
challenged law that many (if not most) then-ongoing acts of draft-card
destruction were coming from war-protesting critics of government policy.
With this speech-related linkage in clear view, it became a possibility (indeed,
a very distinct possibility) that Congress would pass the law (at least in part)
to hamper and punish this especially provocative form of governmentcritiquing expression.
Even more important than this point, however, is a more basic matter:
Cases such as O’Brien arise because the government has compelled the speaker to
make a state-favored, speech-specific choice. In other words, for speakers who
desired to express opposition to the draft, the law at issue in O’Brien forced
them to use a mode of speech that they did not want to use precisely because
they viewed draft-card burning as the most effective and/or most meaningful
means of personal self-expression. In telling contrast, rules that impose
doubly incidental burdens on speech do not compel any speaker to choose
one mode of expression over another (or, for that matter, to make any speechrelated choice at all) for the simple reason that, by definition, they do not
prohibit speech-related activity. Furthermore, doubly-incidental-burdenimposing laws always have something of a fairness-based, sleep-in-the-bed-youmade quality. The late-running reporter could have left for work earlier in the
day; the frustrated taxpayer-publisher did not have to pursue a profit-making
business (with all the ordinary burdens that running such a business brings);
and the defendants in Arcara did not have to permit prostitution and sex acts
to occur on their business premises. Each of those cases thus involves what
might be called a consequential, down-the-line, or (if you will) doubly
incidental burden on speech. Such a burden in its nature impinges on speech
in a less direct way than does imposing a punishment—as necessarily occurs
in all incidental-burden cases—for engaging in expression itself.
To say these things is not to say that courts should reject out of hand all
challenges to laws that impose doubly incidental burdens on expression.
(Indeed, as we have seen, the Court has eschewed this approach by
recognizing many exceptions to the no-review rule laid down in Arcara.) It is
restrictions on speech”); id. at 205 (defending “O’Brien . . . because it assures both the
government’s ability to accomplish its legitimate functions and the protection of speech . . . from
unnecessary restriction”); Shaman, supra note 2, at 462–63 (defending O’Brien as sensibly
steering a “middle course” when a case “combines elements of speech and action”).
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to say instead that placing incidental-burden cases and doubly-incidentalburden cases into different analytical categories comports with a commonsense idea. The idea is that, within a legal regime focused on protecting
“freedom of speech,” there is a built-in logic in distinguishing between laws that
operate against primary conduct that is itself speech and laws that target
primary conduct that does not involve speech at all.387 In short, the Court—
albeit without ever explaining why—has walked on sturdy ground in moving
toward a calibrated system of free-speech review that takes account of whether
generally applicable laws impose direct-in-effect, incidental, or doubly
incidental burdens on speech.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In a famous song of the 1960s, John Sebastian of The Lovin’ Spoonful
reflected in these terms on a mental process often experienced by thoughtful
legal analysts: “But the more I see, the more I see there is to see.”388 There is
a pull in working with the law to reduce its operation to simple-sounding
verbal dictates. This tendency is understandable because the goals of any
sound legal system include fostering predictability and efficiency and
ensuring the equal treatment of individuals who find their way into the courts.
At least in theory, hard-edged and uncomplicated doctrinal formulations
operate to advance these values.
One doctrinal formulation that has attracted a receptive audience
declares without more that “generally applicable laws” should be exempt from
constitutional attack.389 As this Article shows, any effort to describe current
free-speech law in these terms is not only mistaken, but wildly off the mark. In
essence, the Court has resisted so simplistic a sorting mechanism because life
is complex and free-speech values rooted firmly in the constitutional text are
sufficiently weighty that they require more protection than this dismissive
approach would afford.

387. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-7, at 825–32. To be sure, the drawing of the incidentalburden/doubly-incidental-burden distinction might be particularly suspect in a case such as
Arcara itself, given the likelihood of a foreseeable impact of anti-lewdness laws on off-color
bookstore operators. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 480 (noting that “hostility toward certain ideas
about sexual mores—otherwise stated, the desire to maintain status quo ideas about sexuality free
from challenge—[is] likely to color [an otherwise nonideological evaluation of resulting harms]
or trump it entirely”). But this possibility does not change the fact most doubly-incidental-burden
cases do not raise this problem, so that the Arcara rule is at least justifiable as a rule-of-thumb
“administrative device” that sensibly operates “to cabin the circumstances in which incidental
restrictions can raise first amendment questions.” Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 2, at 110.
388. THE LOVIN’ SPOONFUL, She is Still a Mystery, on EVERYTHING PLAYING (Kama Sutra
Records 1967).
389. Notably, this bright-line-rule rhetoric has surfaced in areas of law untethered to First
Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 191–92 (1983) (finding
the balancing approach applied in earlier Contract Clause cases entirely inapplicable to the
challenged statute because it “imposed a generally applicable rule of conduct”).
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The Court instead has erected a doctrinal structure that in fact has
structure because it divides generally applicable laws into three distinct
categories for purposes of Free Speech Clause analysis. This tripartite
framework can and does produce hard questions. Courts will often have to
wrestle with whether a generally applicable law burdens the free-speech right
in a direct-in-effect, incidental, or doubly incidental way. When dealing with
laws that impose direct-in-effect burdens, courts will have to apply strict
means-end analysis in a serious way—sometimes such a serious way that (as
Humanitarian Law Project itself shows) the challenged law will be upheld. With
regard to laws that impose incidental burdens, courts will have to decide
whether O’Brien’s intermediate-scrutiny test is operative and whether it is
satisfied if it does apply. Even when a statute imposes only a doubly incidental
burden on speech—thus bringing the Arcara no-review rule onto the scene—
the court will have to determine whether any of the already-recognized
exceptions to that rule are applicable or whether a new exception should take
hold.
Some observers may find themselves unsettled by the need to address
these sorts of often-difficult questions. But categorization choices, exceptions
to generally operative First Amendment doctrines, and case-specific
applications of strict and intermediate scrutiny are all common features of
free-speech law. As a result, the Court’s incorporation of these features into
the body of constitutional rules that govern cases concerning generally
applicable laws is in line with themes and practices that mark—indeed,
routinely mark—judicial work with the Free Speech Clause.
All of this helps to underscore the central message of this Article. At
bottom, the analysis offered here shows that the existing doctrinal landscape
provides thoughtful lawyers with rich opportunities to craft innovative
arguments in advancing free-speech challenges to generally applicable laws,
and in defending those laws as well. At the same time, those opportunities will
be available as a practical matter to those lawyers only if they come to grasp
the rhetoric around which the Court’s three-part doctrinal structure is built,
the different styles of scrutiny that different categories of generally applicable
laws trigger, the proper scope of the principles established by key Supreme
Court precedents, and the push that underlying free-expression-related
policies can exert as courts make their way through particular disputes. These
many opportunities offer a reminder of a deeper point too—that, as Justice
Cardozo once observed, the work of those who toil in the law “in its highest
reaches is not discovery, but creation.”390

390. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Lecture IV, Adherence to Precedent, The Subconscious Element
in the Judicial Process, Conclusion, delivered at Yale Law School (1921) in THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).

